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Lessons from Wynne: Why New York City’s Internally 
Consistent Income Tax Nonetheless Violates the 
Dormant Commerce Clause
ALEXANDER G. ANDREWS
In Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, the United States Supreme 
Court held unconstitutional Maryland’s refusal to allow a taxpayer to credit income 
taxes paid to other states against a purportedly local income tax. This holding could have 
important consequences for similar income tax schemes, namely New York’s. This Note 
analyzes the New York City income tax in light of Wynne. Specifically, this Note 
evaluates the constitutionality of the New York City income tax when viewed in tandem 
with the State income tax (of which it is a part) in response to an as applied challenge to 
the law. It concludes that the State’s refusal to allow taxpayers a credit for income taxes 
paid to other states against the New York City income tax is unconstitutional.
Part I of this Note examines the history and roots of the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine. Part II narrows the discussion to the Court’s application of the dormant 
Commerce Clause to state taxation of interstate commerce. Part III explains the intense 
opposition to the dormant Commerce Clause by a minority of justices on the Court. Part 
IV analyzes Wynne with an emphasis on its application to the New York income tax 
statute. Part V explains that while the New York City income tax is internally consistent 
and non-discriminatory when viewed in isolation, that description is irrelevant to the 
constitutional analysis. This Part demonstrates that the New York City income tax is an 
integral part of the New York State income tax despite its label, which misleads the non-
discrimination inquiry.
Through examining the Court’s discrimination case law and the relevant scholarly 
literature, this Note concludes that the internally consistent New York City income tax, 
when viewed in tandem with the New York State income tax (of which it is an organic 
part), nonetheless discriminates against interstate commerce and therefore violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause. This Note also analyzes general principles of international 
taxation and the Court’s teaching in the sales and use tax context to determine that a 
residence state must grant a credit for income taxes paid to a source state to alleviate any 
resulting double taxation.
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Lessons from Wynne: Why New York City’s Internally 
Consistent Income Tax Nonetheless Violates the 
Dormant Commerce Clause
ALEXANDER G. ANDREWS *
INTRODUCTION
In Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, the United 
States Supreme Court held that Maryland’s refusal to allow a credit for 
income taxes paid to other states against the county portion of the State 
income tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause.1 While no other state 
has an income tax statute identical to that of Maryland, the Wynne holding 
could have important consequences for similar income tax schemes, 
particularly New York’s. This Note analyzes the New York City income 
tax in light of Wynne. Specifically, this Note evaluates the constitutionality 
of the New York City income tax when viewed in tandem with the State 
income tax (of which it is a part) in response to an as applied challenge to 
the law. It concludes that the State’s refusal to allow taxpayers a credit for 
income taxes paid to other states against the New York City income tax2 is 
unconstitutional. The important questions this Note resolves are that: (1) an 
internally consistent tax may nonetheless be discriminatory, and (2) states 
taxing income based on residence must yield to states taxing income based 
on source by providing a credit to offset any double taxation that results 
when two sovereigns exercise their legitimate taxing powers.
Part I of this Note examines the history and roots of the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine. Part II narrows the discussion to the Court’s 
                                                                                                                         
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2019; University of Connecticut, cum 
laude, B.A. 2016. I am eminently grateful to Professor Ruth Mason, Professor Walter Hellerstein, 
Professor Edward A. Zelinsky, Steven N. Wlodychak, Timothy P. Noonan, Robert D. Plattner, and Dr. 
James W. Wetzler for reviewing an earlier draft of this Note and providing helpful commentary. I
would like to extend further acknowledgements to my colleagues on the Connecticut Law Review—
particularly our Editor-in-Chief Andrew Ammirati, Managing Editor Michael Rondon, and Assistant 
Managing Editor Elizabeth Santovasi—for their meticulous editing. Moreover, I am incredibly honored 
that the Judge John R. Brown Scholarship Foundation selected this Note as a finalist for the 2018 
Brown Award for Excellence in Legal Writing. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents 
(Corina and Drew Andrews), grandparents (Marie Andrews, Monika Norberg, and Forrest Norberg), 
and sister (Nicole Andrews) for their love and support in all of my endeavors. This Note is dedicated to 
my late grandfather George Andrews, who passed away shortly after my 1L year. The views expressed 
in this Note are solely those of the Author. Any errors or omissions are mine.
1 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1792 (2015).
2 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1310 (McKinney 2018) (listing permissible credits against income taxes 
imposed by cities, which does not include income taxes paid to other states).
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application of the dormant Commerce Clause to state taxation of interstate 
commerce. Part III explains the intense opposition to the dormant 
Commerce Clause by a minority of justices on the Court. This Part
specifically explores the concerns of the late Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice 
Clarence Thomas, and recently confirmed Justice Neil Gorsuch. Part IV 
analyzes Wynne with an emphasis on its application to the New York 
income tax statute.
Part V explains that while the New York City income tax is internally 
consistent and non-discriminatory when viewed in isolation, that 
description is irrelevant to the constitutional analysis. This Part 
demonstrates that the New York City income tax is an integral part of the 
New York State income tax despite its label, which misleads the 
non-discrimination inquiry.
Through examining the Court’s discrimination case law and the 
relevant scholarly literature, this Part concludes that the internally 
consistent New York City income tax, when viewed in tandem with the 
New York State income tax (of which it is an organic part), nonetheless 
discriminates against interstate commerce and therefore violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause. Part V analyzes general principles of 
international taxation and the Court’s teaching in the sales and use tax 
context to determine that a residence state must grant a credit for income 
taxes paid to a source state to alleviate any resulting double taxation. This 
Note concludes that, in narrow circumstances, New York’s refusal to grant 
a credit for income taxes paid to other states against the New York City 
income tax violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution grants 
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, . . . among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”3
The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the authority to 
regulate interstate commerce,4 which allows it to preempt the states from 
doing so.5 The United States Supreme Court has “further” interpreted the 
                                                                                                                         
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This Note hereinafter refers to this constitutional provision’s 
interstate feature as the “Commerce Clause.” While interesting and sometimes relevant in other tax 
cases, the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause are not within the scope of this
Note. For an in-depth examination of the Indian Commerce Clause and state taxation, see Richard D. 
Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 TAX LAW. 897 
(2010).
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5 See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (citation omitted) 
(“Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and health standards 
applicable to all businesses affecting interstate commerce and thereby brought the Federal government 
into a field that traditionally had been occupied by the States.”).
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Commerce Clause to “contain a[n] . . . [implicit] negative command,
known as the dormant Commerce Clause, [which] prohibit[s]” the states 
from impermissibly burdening interstate commerce “even when Congress 
has failed to legislate on the subject.”6 Consistent with the concept of
preemption, however, Congress may consent to burdensome state 
regulation of interstate commerce that would, in the absence of 
congressional action, offend the dormant Commerce Clause.7
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine traces its roots to the seminal 
case of Gibbons v. Ogden,8 even though it would appear that the Court did 
not explicitly use the term until 1945.9 The doctrine does not bar all state 
regulation of interstate commerce; it merely precludes states from enacting 
                                                                                                                         
6 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794; see also RICHARD D. POMP, STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 1-4 (8th ed. 
2015) (“[T]he Commerce Clause does not explicitly proscribe state regulation or taxation of interstate 
commerce . . . . Th[e] [dormant Commerce Clause] doctrine asserts that some constraint on state 
taxation or regulation is required by the policies underlying the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding that 
Congress neither prohibited nor preempted the legislation at issue.”). This Note hereinafter refers to the 
Commerce Clause’s implicit negative command as the “dormant Commerce Clause.”
7 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429–30 (1946) (“Obviously Congress’ 
purpose [in enacting the McCarran Act] was broadly to give support to the existing and future state 
systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance. This was done in two ways. One was by 
removing obstructions which might be thought to flow from its own power, whether dormant or 
exercised, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act itself or in future legislation.”). In Wynne,
Justice Scalia criticized this concept. See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted) (“The clearest sign that the negative Commerce Clause is a judicial fraud is the utterly 
illogical holding that congressional consent enables States to enact laws that would otherwise constitute 
impermissible burdens upon interstate commerce. How could congressional consent lift a constitutional 
prohibition?”). His argument is rather strange. The dormant Commerce Clause is implicit, whereas the 
Commerce Clause is an explicit grant to Congress. Of course Congress can permit states to enact laws 
that would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause—the Commerce Clause expressly 
authorizes it to do so.
8 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 13 (1824) (explaining that the states have no general 
concurrent commerce powers and that Congress’ commerce authority reigns supreme over that of the 
states in certain circumstances); Norman R. Williams, The Dormant Commerce Clause: Why Gibbons 
v. Ogden Should be Restored to the Canon, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 817, 823 (2005) (emphasis added) 
(“But what about all the various regulatory laws, such as health inspection laws, that the states had 
adopted? They were manifestly not adopted pursuant to the state’s taxation authority. Did not their 
existence and uncontested validity demonstrate that the states retained the power to regulate interstate 
commerce? [Chief Justice] Marshall’s answer was no, and his explanation formed the early framework 
for assessing dormant Commerce Clause challenges.”); POMP, supra note 6, at 1-5 (“In Gibbons v. 
Ogden . . . Chief Justice Marshall in dictum . . . supported a reading of the [Commerce] Clause that 
would grant Congress broad power to regulate ‘commerce which concerns more states than one,’ while 
allowing a state to ‘regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens,’ even if that 
regulation had an impact on interstate commerce.”).
9 After searching both Westlaw and Lexis using the search term “dormant Commerce Clause” and 
the filter “United States Supreme Court cases,” the earliest case in which the term appears is Hill v. St. 
of Fla. ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 547–48 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(“The same regard for the harmonious balance of our federal system, whereby the States may protect 
local interests despite the dormant Commerce Clause, allows State legislation for the protection of local 
interests so long as Congress has not supplanted local regulation either by a regulation of its own or by 
an unmistakable indication that there is to be no regulation at all.”).
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laws that impermissibly burden,10 interfere with, or discriminate against11
interstate commerce. The Court has expounded on the theory that the 
primary concern of the Commerce Clause is economic protectionism—that 
is, laws that act as tariffs on interstate commerce.12 Some justices have 
vigorously disputed this theory,13 but the majority of the Court remains 
comfortable with such an interpretation of this constitutional provision.14
In a dormant Commerce Clause inquiry, courts subject state laws that 
facially discriminate against interstate commerce to strict scrutiny review.15
A facially discriminatory law will survive this level of scrutiny only if it 
serves a legitimate local purpose that the state cannot further by less 
discriminatory means.16 Such laws are rare and will almost always fail the 
strict scrutiny test, thus violating the dormant Commerce Clause.17 More 
common are facially non-discriminatory state laws that, in practical 
application, affect interstate commerce. Courts effectively subject these 
laws to a rational basis level of scrutiny18 and they often survive.19 Most
                                                                                                                         
10 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
11 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994).
12 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794 (“By prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing 
excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval, [the dormant Commerce 
Clause] strikes at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs 
and other laws that burdened interstate commerce.”); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 
192 (1994) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988)) (“Th[e] 
‘negative’ aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism—that is, regulatory 
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors . . . .”);
POMP, supra note 6, at 1-4 (“The Court has recently described the dormant Commerce Clause as 
serving the ‘purpose of preventing a State from retreating into economic isolation or jeopardizing the 
welfare of the Nation as a whole, as it would do if it were free to place burdens on the flow of 
commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear.’ The 
provision thus ‘reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the 
Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid 
the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later 
among the States under the Articles of Confederation.’”).
13 See infra Part III.
14 In Wynne, the only justices that indicated a willingness to revisit the doctrine were Justice 
Scalia and Justice Thomas. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1811 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); see also POMP, supra note 6, at 1-5 (“Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas are the two sitting 
justices most willing to re-examine the doctrine.”).
15 Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 100–01.
16 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 581 (1997).
17 But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (“The evidence in this case amply supports 
the District Court’s findings that Maine’s [facially discriminatory] ban on the importation of live 
baitfish serves legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by available 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”).
18 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”).
19 See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 339 (2008) (“State laws frequently 
survive this Pike scrutiny. . . .”).
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have only an “incidental” impact on interstate commerce.20
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION
Taxation is a common form of state regulation of interstate commerce.
Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has applied the dormant 
Commerce Clause in numerous cases questioning the constitutionality of 
state taxation. The application of the doctrine to state taxation has 
substantially evolved.21
A. The Court’s Early Formalism Regarding State Taxation of Interstate 
Commerce
Initially, the Court held that state taxation of interstate commerce “in 
any form” offended the Commerce Clause.22 The Court’s holding in 
Leloup v. Port of Mobile is an example of a dormant Commerce Clause 
holding in a state tax case prior to the Court’s actual adoption of the term.23
As Justice Samuel Alito explained in Wynne, the doctrine certainly has 
“deep roots”24 in the context of state taxation.25
One year prior to Leloup, the Court rendered an even more expansive 
decision. In Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, the Court held that 
state taxation of interstate commerce is unconstitutional even when the 
state levies the same amount of tax on intrastate commerce.26 Over time, 
the Court retreated from this per se formalistic approach, simply adopting 
another formal methodology.
This new methodology led the Court to hold unconstitutional “direct” 
state taxation of interstate commerce, such as direct taxation of gross 
                                                                                                                         
20 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
21 See POMP, supra note 6, at 1-9 to 1-21 (detailing the evolution of the Court’s state tax dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
22 See Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (“In our opinion such a construction of 
the Constitution leads to the conclusion that no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in 
any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on 
the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, and the 
reason is that such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, which 
belongs solely to Congress.”).
23 Id.
24 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015).
25 Never one to miss an opportunity to use his caustic wit to emphasize a point, the late Justice 
Scalia compared these “roots” to “weeds.” See id. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (responding to the 
majority’s argument that the dormant Commerce Clause “has deep roots” by countering, “[s]o it does, 
like many weeds”).
26 See Robbins v. Shelby Cty. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887) (emphasis added) 
(“Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on 
domestic commerce, or that which is carried on solely within the state.”).
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receipts from interstate commerce27 and direct taxation of freight 
transported in interstate commerce.28 Having adopted the rubric of direct 
taxation, the Court upheld an indirect franchise tax measured by gross 
receipts from interstate commerce.29 Such a tax is substantively identical to 
a direct tax on gross receipts, but the Court honored form over substance—
which, as discussed below, is the inverse of its thinking today.30
B. The Erosion of Formalism: The Multiple Taxation Analysis
Over time, the Court’s formalistic thinking began to erode as new
justices joined the Court. This erosion began in 1927 with Justice Harlan 
Stone’s dissent in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania.31 Justice Stone argued that the 
formalistic approach that the Court employed had lost its value.32 He 
decried the formula as rigid and difficult to apply.33
While in the minority in Di Santo, Justice Stone shortly thereafter 
expressed his anti-formalism in his “famous”34 Western Live Stock v. 
Bureau of Revenue majority opinion.35 The tax at issue in Western Live 
Stock was a New Mexico franchise tax measured by gross receipts.36 The 
appellant, Western Live Stock, published, edited, and prepared a livestock 
trade journal solely in that State.37 The question in the case was whether 
New Mexico could constitutionally tax Western Live Stock’s receipts from 
out-of-state advertisers.38 Under previous precedent, the Court would have 
upheld the tax solely because the State labeled it an indirect franchise tax 
as opposed to a direct gross receipts tax—in form, a permissible indirect
interference with interstate commerce. 
Justice Stone took a more pragmatic approach. He first rejected 
Western Live Stock’s claim that the Commerce Clause insulated the out-
                                                                                                                         
27 See N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes & Assessments of N.J., 280 U.S. 338, 339 (1930) 
(“It is therefore a direct tax on gross receipts derived from interstate commerce, and to that extent, an 
invalid regulation of or burden upon such commerce.”).
28 See In re State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232, 278–79 (1872) (“[The tax upon freight] must therefore 
be considered an exaction, in right of alleged sovereignty, from freight transported, or the right of 
transportation out of, or into, or through the State—a burden upon interstate intercourse.”).
29 Maine v. Grand Truck Ry., 142 U.S. 217, 228–29 (1891).
30 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (announcing what has 
come to be known as the Complete Auto test).
31 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
32 See id. at 44 (“[T]he traditional test of the limit of state action [that] inquir[es] whether the 
interference with commerce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its 
application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value.”).
33 Id.
34 POMP, supra note 6, at 1-12.
35 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 253 (1938).
36 Id. at 251–52.
37 Id. at 252; see POMP, supra note 6, at 1-12 (“All the work in preparing the magazine took place 
in New Mexico.”).
38 Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 252.
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of-state advertising receipts from taxation simply because they arose from 
an interstate contract.39 Invoking concepts similar to today’s state tax terms 
of art “nexus” and “unitary business,” he held that New Mexico could tax 
the receipts from out-of-state advertisers because Western Live Stock 
prepared, printed, and published the magazine advertisements in that 
State.40
Even more presciently, Justice Stone identified the concept of
apportionment as a mechanism for deciding whether New Mexico’s 
taxation of the out-of-state advertisement receipts was impermissible 
because the interstate distribution of the magazine enhanced the value of 
those advertisements.41 The Court responded to this question in the 
negative, holding that the purported burden on interstate commerce was 
“too remote and too attenuated.”42 Justice Stone found it decisive that no
other state could duplicate the New Mexico tax; there was no potential risk 
of “multiple taxation.”43 The Court concluded that the Commerce Clause 
does not shield businesses engaged in interstate commerce from their fair 
share of a state’s tax burden44—a rejection of prior precedent,45 and a 
vitalization of the principle of fairly apportioned state taxation.
After Western Live Stock, the multiple taxation analysis seemingly 
became the rule.46 In J.D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, the Court 
held that an unapportioned gross receipts tax created a substantial risk of “a
double tax burden,” and therefore violated the Commerce Clause.47 The 
Court concluded that other states could tax the receipts from interstate 
activities that Indiana taxed—for example, states where the goods were 
sold and manufactured—and thus held that the tax favored intrastate over 
interstate commerce.48
                                                                                                                         
39 Id. at 253.
40 Id. at 258.
41 Id. at 254–55. The implication being that some other state (or states) should be allowed to tax 
the receipts because their value could be attributed to states other than New Mexico.
42 Id. at 259.
43 Id. at 260; see POMP, supra note 6, at 1-13 (“Justice Stone articulated a cumulative burdens or 
multiple taxation analysis . . . .”).
44 Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 254.
45 See Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (holding that state taxation of interstate 
commerce in any form violates the Commerce Clause).
46 See POMP, supra note 6, at 1-17 (explaining that the Court “seemed to have abandoned . . . the 
old ‘direct-indirect’ test . . . in Western Live Stock.”).
47 See J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938) (emphasis added) (“The vice of 
the statute as applied to receipts from interstate sales is that the tax includes in its measure, without 
apportionment, receipts derived from activities in interstate commerce; and that the exaction is of such 
character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent by states in which the goods are 
sold as well as those in which they are manufactured. Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to 
the risk of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce 
clause forbids.”).
48 Id.
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Before finally settling Justice Stone’s pragmatic multiple taxation 
approach in its jurisprudence, the Court briefly retreated to formalism.49
Justice Felix Frankfurter, a diehard dormant Commerce Clause 
proponent,50 took his last stand in Freeman v. Hewit51 and Spector Motor 
Service, Inc. v. O’Connor.52
With Justice Frankfurter writing the majority opinion, the Court in 
Freeman held that an Indiana gross receipts tax imposed directly upon 
interstate sales was unconstitutional merely due to its form.53 Similarly, in 
Spector, the Court held that a Connecticut tax on the privilege of doing 
business—as applied to businesses solely involved in interstate 
commerce—was unconstitutional.54 The Court asserted that its holding in 
Spector did not conflict with prior decisions permitting states to tax the 
privilege of doing business where a taxpayer’s business was both intrastate 
and interstate.55 According to the Court, the Connecticut tax at issue was 
not facially invalid, but invalid as applied to solely interstate businesses.56
The multiple taxation analysis that the Court articulated in Western 
Live Stock returned shortly after Spector.57 In Northwestern States Portland 
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, the Court held that, absent discrimination or 
unfair apportionment, a state may tax an out-of-state corporation’s net 
income from its interstate operations.58 The Court did not dispose of 
Spector, but instead opted to distinguish it on technical grounds.59
                                                                                                                         
49 See POMP, supra note 6, at 1-16 (explaining that “the Court under the leadership of Justice 
Frankfurter started to back slide” toward formalism).
50 See id. at 1-17 (“Justice Frankfurter [was] interest[ed] in a free trade zone . . . [protected] ‘from 
interference by the States.’”).
51 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
52 Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
53 See Freeman, 329 U.S. at 256 (“[A] seller State has various means of obtaining legitimate 
contribution to the costs of its government, without imposing a direct tax on interstate sales. While 
these permitted taxes may, in an ultimate sense, come out of interstate commerce, they are not, as 
would be a tax on gross receipts, a direct imposition on that very freedom of commercial flow which 
for more than a hundred and fifty years has been the ward of the Commerce Clause.”).
54 Spector, 340 U.S. at 603.
55 Id. at 609–10.
56 See id. (footnote omitted) (“Our conclusion is not in conflict with the principle that, where a 
taxpayer is engaged both in intrastate and interstate commerce, a state may tax the privilege of carrying 
on intrastate business and, within reasonable limits, may compute the amount of the charge by applying 
the tax rate to a fair proportion of the taxpayer’s business done within the state, including both 
interstate and intrastate.”).
57 See POMP, supra note 6, at 1-19 (“Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota
abandoned Justice Frankfurter’s views and . . . [the Court] return[ed] to its prior emphasis on multiple 
taxation . . . .”).
58 Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minn., 358 U.S. 450, 461–63 (1959).
59 See id. at 463–64 (quoting Spector, 340 U.S. at 603) (“[T]he tax [in Spector] was ‘imposed 
upon the franchise of a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business within the State . . . .’ . . . 
It was not a levy on net income but an excise or tax placed on the franchise of a foreign corporation 
engaged ‘exclusively’ in interstate operations.”).
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Eventually, the Court remedied this judicial fecklessness in Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady when it explicitly overruled Spector.60
C. The Death of Formalism: The Complete Auto Test
The death of formalism and the advent of a new test for subjecting 
state taxation to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny arose in Complete 
Auto. The Court eliminated the Spector rule from its jurisprudence, 
proclaiming that it “has no relationship to economic realities” and acts 
simply “as a trap for the unwary draftsman.”61 The Court insightfully 
recognized that draftsmanship was the only distinguishing factor in 
Northwestern States and Spector, even though the cases had distinct 
outcomes.62
In Complete Auto, the Court methodically examined two cases that 
exemplified the flawed nature of the Spector rule—Railway Express I63 and 
Railway Express II.64 In Railway Express I, the Court held that Virginia’s 
annual license tax on gross receipts for the privilege of doing business
violated the Commerce Clause.65 The Court determined that the tax was 
unconstitutional because it was a direct tax on the privilege of doing 
business as opposed to an indirect property tax.66 To remedy this 
constitutional infirmity, Virginia redrafted its tax statute, labeling it a
franchise tax on intangible property in the form of going concern value 
measured by gross receipts.67 In Railway Express II, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the reworded statute.68 Recognizing the 
preposterousness of the Railway Express cases and unwilling to continue to 
“attach[] constitutional significance to . . . semantic difference[s]” any 
longer,69 the Court in Complete Auto essentially rationalized the analysis.
The Court has since interpreted Complete Auto as creating a four-
pronged test for subjecting state taxation of interstate commerce to 
                                                                                                                         
60 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288–89 (1977).
61 Id. at 279.
62 See id. at 285 (“Thus, applying the rule of Northwestern Cement to the facts of Spector, it is 
clear that Connecticut could have taxed the apportioned net income derived from the exclusively 
interstate commerce. It could not, however, tax the ‘privilege’ of doing business as measured by the 
apportioned net income. The reason for attaching constitutional significance to a semantic difference is 
difficult to discern.”).
63 Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954) [hereinafter Railway Express I].
64 Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) [hereinafter Railway Express II].
65 Railway Express I, 347 U.S. at 369.
66 See id. (“We think we can only regard this tax as being in fact and effect just what the 
Legislature said it was—a privilege tax, and one that cannot be applied to an exclusively interstate 
business.”).
67 Railway Express II, 358 U.S. at 438.
68 Id. at 441–42.
69 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 285 (1977) (“The reason for attaching 
constitutional significance to a semantic difference is difficult to discern.”).
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constitutional scrutiny. Under the Complete Auto test, state taxation 
survives the dormant Commerce Clause when it: (1) is applied to an 
activity with substantial nexus to the taxing state; (2) is fairly apportioned;
(3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly 
related to the services provided by the taxing state.70
1. Nexus
Under the first prong of Complete Auto, a state can only tax activities 
that have a substantial nexus to it.71 Prior to Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,
Due Process Clause nexus and Commerce Clause nexus were identical.72
The Court had never before examined nexus separately under the two 
different clauses.73
In Quill, the Court held that North Dakota could not compel a
corporation without physical presence in the State to collect its use tax on 
sales made to North Dakota customers.74 In so ruling, the Court held that 
the Commerce Clause, but not the Due Process Clause, requires physical 
presence nexus for a state to require a vendor to collect its use tax.75 After 
Quill, Due Process Clause nexus became substantively identical to the 
“minimum contacts” nexus required for subjecting an individual to a state 
court’s personal jurisdiction,76 whereas the Commerce Clause set a higher 
bar.
Nonetheless, even after Quill, the Commerce Clause demanded a lower 
standard of nexus for the imposition of an income tax than for the 
collection of a use tax. Whereas the Commerce Clause commanded a
considerably higher standard than the Due Process Clause for the 
collection of a use tax, it required only a slightly higher standard (economic 
nexus) for the imposition of an income tax.77 While never decided by the 
                                                                                                                         
70 Id. at 279.
71 Id.
72 See Richard D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65 AM. U. L. REV.
1115, 1144 (2016) (explaining that prior precedent did not support the bifurcation of Due Process 
Clause and Commerce Clause nexus in Quill).
73 See id. at 1145 (“As two leading scholars noted, the Court’s failure to cite any other cases was 
not an oversight: ‘the Court’s discovery that ‘[d]espite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus 
requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical’ is more accurately viewed as 
a doctrinal epiphany than as a logical inference to be drawn from the careful reading of its 
precedents.’”).
74 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1992).
75 Id.
76 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
77 See KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 325–26 (Iowa 2010), cert. denied,
565 U.S. 817 (Oct. 3, 2011) (“We also doubt that the [United States] Supreme Court would extend the 
‘physical presence’ rule outside the sales and use tax context of Quill.”); Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax 
Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (Nov. 29, 1993) (“We hold that by 
licensing intangibles for use in this State and deriving income from their use here, Geoffrey has a 
‘substantial nexus’ [under the Commerce Clause] with South Carolina.”).
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United States Supreme Court, the majority of state supreme courts have 
held that economic nexus grants a state Commerce Clause permission to 
levy an income tax.78 In this respect, the now defunct physical presence 
requirement of Quill never applied to income taxes.79
Twenty-six years later, the Supreme Court overruled Quill’s 
Commerce Clause holding in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.80 In Wayfair,
the Court abrogated the physical presence rule and held that certain remote 
vendors’ significant “economic and virtual contacts” with South Dakota 
satisfied Complete Auto’s substantial nexus requirement.81 In so ruling, the 
Court set a much lower nexus standard—economic nexus—for the
collection of a use tax.82 It would appear that economic nexus now permits 
a state to both levy an income tax and compel remote vendors to collect its
use tax under Complete Auto’s first prong.
2. Fair Apportionment
Under the second prong of Complete Auto, state taxation of interstate 
commerce must be fairly apportioned.83 The Court has further articulated 
two subprongs of the fair apportionment prong—internal consistency and 
external consistency.84
A state tax is internally consistent if a taxpayer engaged in interstate 
commerce would not bear a greater total tax burden than a taxpayer 
engaged in intrastate commerce in a hypothetical world where every state 
                                                                                                                         
78 POMP, supra note 6, at 11-213 to -214.
79 Id.
80 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
81 Id.
82 See id. (internal citations omitted) (“In the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess, the first prong of 
Complete Auto asks whether the tax applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state . 
. . . Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and virtual contacts respondents 
have with the State. The Act only applies to sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or 
services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods and 
services into the State on an annual basis. This quantity of business could not have occurred unless the 
seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota. And 
respondents are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual presence. 
Thus, the substantial nexus requirement of Complete Auto is satisfied in this case.”).
83 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
84 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (“For over a decade 
now, we have assessed any threat of malapportionment by asking whether the tax is ‘internally 
consistent’ and, if so, whether it is ‘externally consistent’ as well.”). The internal consistency subprong 
first appeared in the Court’s jurisprudence in Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 
159, 169 (1983) (emphasis added) (“The first, and again obvious, component of fairness in an 
apportionment formula is what might be called internal consistency—that is the formula must be such 
that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business’s 
income being taxed.”). For an in-depth discussion of the merits of the internal consistency test and the 
Court’s application of this subprong in pre-Wynne case law, see Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal 
Consistency” Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 138 (1988) and Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?: Reflections on an 
Evolving Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 61 TAX L. REV. 1 (2007).
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levied an identical tax.85 An internally inconsistent tax fails the fair 
apportionment prong prima facie, and is therefore unconstitutional.86 If a 
tax is internally consistent, inquiry into external consistency follows.  
A tax is externally consistent if it does not “reach[] beyond that portion 
of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing 
State.”87 There is no innate or inherent aspect of the external consistency 
inquiry, but actual multiple taxation may indicate external inconsistency.88
One leading scholar believes that the Wynne holding may render external 
consistency obsolete.89
3. Non-Discriminatory
Under the third prong of Complete Auto, state taxation cannot 
discriminate against interstate commerce.90 A state satisfies the non-
discrimination prong if it taxes interstate commerce at the same rate as 
intrastate commerce, so that a taxpayer engaged in interstate commerce 
does not bear a greater total tax burden than one engaged in purely 
intrastate commerce.91
Internally inconsistent taxes are a priori discriminatory.92 Importantly, 
an internally consistent tax is not necessarily non-discriminatory—a
proposition the Court did not address in Wynne. The second prong of 
Complete Auto conflates with the third prong when a tax is internally 
inconsistent, but not necessarily when a tax is internally consistent.
For example, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, the Court held 
                                                                                                                         
85 Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185.
86 Id. (emphasis added) (“A failure of internal consistency shows as a matter of law that a State is 
attempting to take more than its fair share of taxes from the interstate transaction, since allowing such a 
tax in one State would place interstate commerce at the mercy of those remaining States that might 
impose an identical tax.”).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Edward A. Zelinsky, The Enigma of Wynne, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 797, 808–10 (2016).
90 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
91 See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1805 (2015) (“The critical 
point is that the total tax burden on interstate commerce is higher, not that Maryland may receive more 
or less tax revenue from a particular taxpayer.”); Jesse H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause: The Object-Measure Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 214 (1998) 
(“Under current doctrine, [the third prong] appears to be satisfied if the tax is applied at the same rate to 
intrastate and interstate business.”).
92 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1805 (holding that Maryland’s internally inconsistent personal income 
tax regime was discriminatory and therefore violated the dormant Commerce Clause); Armco, Inc. v. 
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984) (“In [Container], the Court [announced the internal consistency 
test]. In that case, the Court was discussing the requirement that a tax be fairly apportioned . . . A
similar rule applies where the allegation is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate 
commerce. A tax that unfairly apportions income from other States is a form of discrimination against 
interstate commerce.”). But see Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 
438 (upholding an internally inconsistent Michigan flat fee on trucks engaged in commercial hauling 
because the State imposed the tax on purely local activity).
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that New York’s corporate franchise tax credit measured by the amount of 
exports shipped from an in-state location discriminated against interstate 
export shipping and therefore offended the dormant Commerce Clause.93
Even though this provision was internally consistent—if every state 
adopted an identical credit, a New York corporation shipping exports from,
say, Connecticut would not bear a greater total franchise tax burden than a 
New York corporation shipping exports from New York—the Court 
nonetheless held it to be discriminatory. Other examples of internally 
consistent state tax provisions that courts have nevertheless struck down as 
discriminatory include accelerated depreciation deductions limited to in-
state property94 and a corporate franchise tax credit for in-state 
investment.95
                                                                                                                         
93 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 407 (1984).
94 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Fin., 667 N.Y.S. 2d 4, 9, 11 (App. Div. 
1997); Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, Docket Nos. 91-I-100, 91-I-101, 91-I-102, 1993 
WL 57202, at *3 (Wis. Tax App. Comm’n Feb. 24, 1993).
95 Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2004).
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4. Fair Relation to Services Provided by the Taxing State
The fourth prong of Complete Auto requires state taxation to be fairly 
related to the services provided by the taxing state.96 The Court effectively 
eviscerated this prong in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana.97
Under current doctrine, the fair relation analysis is a rather spineless 
inquiry. State taxation will never fail this prong, as it requires no detailed 
measurements or calculations to prove the requisite fair relation.98
Additionally, courts consider benefits wholly unrelated to the taxable event
in the fair relation analysis.99 Police protection, fire protection, and a state’s 
“maintenance of a civilized society”—all three of which facilitate business 
transactions—will always satisfy the fair relation prong.100 In a sense, the 
fourth prong conflates with the first—taxes that satisfy the nexus 
requirement will surely satisfy the fair relation requirement.101
III. CRITICISM OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
Originalist justices virulently oppose the dormant Commerce Clause,
seeing it as unsupported by the text of the Constitution and a quintessential 
example of “judicially created” law.102 Opponents of the dormant 
Commerce Clause include the late Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and 
(probably)103 recently confirmed Justice Gorsuch.104 Both the late Justice 
                                                                                                                         
96 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
97 See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627–28 (1981) (citations omitted) 
(“The simple fact is that the appropriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for legislative, 
and not judicial, resolution. In essence, appellants ask this Court to prescribe a test for the validity of 
state taxes that would require state and federal courts, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to 
calculate acceptable rates or levels of taxation of activities that are conceded to be legitimate subjects of 
taxation. This we decline to do.”).
98 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 199 (1995) (“The [fourth prong] 
requires no detailed accounting of the services provided to the taxpayer on account of the activity being 
taxed, nor, indeed, is a State limited to offsetting the public costs created by the taxed activity.”).
99 Id. at 199–200.
100 Id. at 200.
101 See Choper & Yin, supra note 91, at 215 (opining that the fourth factor of the Complete Auto
test appears redundant in light of the first factor’s nexus requirement).
102 See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (condemning the dormant Commerce Clause as a “judicial fraud” and a “brazen 
invention”); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to the dormant Commerce Clause as “judicially created” law).
103 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100–01 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(“My agreement with the Court’s discussion of the history of our dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause 
jurisprudence, however, should not be mistaken for agreement with all aspects of the doctrine. The 
Commerce Clause is found in Article I and authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 
Meanwhile, our dormant commerce cases suggest Article III courts may invalidate state laws that 
offend no congressional statute. Whether and how much of this can be squared with the text of the 
Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or defended as misbranded products of federalism or 
antidiscrimination imperatives flowing from Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause are 
questions for another day.”); Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016)
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Scalia and Justice Thomas have flamboyantly eviscerated the doctrine in
dissents and concurrences.105 Their criticisms are similar, but not identical. 
Justice Scalia deeply respected stare decisis, whereas Justice Thomas
gives it little to no weight.106 Also, unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia 
was willing to use the dormant Commerce Clause to strike down facially 
discriminatory state laws.107 A deeper analysis of the late Justice Scalia’s,
Justice Thomas’, and Justice Gorsuch’s views with respect to the dormant 
Commerce Clause follows.
                                                                                                                         
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (“[T]he Commerce Clause is found in Article I of the 
Constitution and it grants Congress the authority to adopt laws regulating interstate commerce. 
Meanwhile, in dormant commerce clause cases Article III courts have claimed the (anything but 
dormant) power to strike down some state laws even in the absence of congressional direction.”).
Professor Edward A. Zelinsky describes Justice Gorsuch as “leery of the dormant Commerce Clause” 
and believes that he “[]probably[]” views it as a “misbegotten project.” Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Comparing Wayfair to Wynne: Lessons for the Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 22 CHAP. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018–2019) (manuscript at 5, 20) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3249785).
104 Previous justices have also expressed criticism of the doctrine, albeit with less forcefulness or 
“scholarly weaponry.” See POMP, supra note 6, at 1-4 n.17 (explaining that “Justice [Hugo] Black 
expressed similar views to Justice Scalia,” minus the intellectual ammunition); id. at 1-6 n.26 
(describing “Chief Justice [Roger] Taney’s rejection of the dormant Commerce Clause” and “similar 
views expressed . . . by Justice[] [William] Douglas and [Justice] Black.”). Like Justice Thomas (but 
unlike Justice Scalia), Chief Justice Taney “would have upheld a tax that discriminated against 
interstate commerce.” Id.
At the end of the Supreme Court’s 2018 term, Justice Anthony Kennedy retired and President 
Donald Trump nominated then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to replace 
him. Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Brett Kavanaugh is Trump’s Pick for Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-
court.html. After a contentious and highly partisan confirmation battle, the Senate, by a narrow 50 to 48 
vote, confirmed then-Judge Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court. Clare Foran & Stephen Collinson, Brett 
Kavanaugh confirmed to Supreme Court, CNN, Oct. 6, 2018, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/06/politics/kavanaugh-final-confirmation-vote/index.html. If Justice 
Kavanaugh shares the skepticism of the late Justice Scalia and Justices Thomas and Gorsuch with 
respect to the dormant Commerce Clause (which is no guarantee), the Court’s state tax jurisprudence 
could change significantly. For example, three dormant Commerce Clause skeptics could join with just 
two of the Court’s liberals to uphold state taxes similar to Maryland’s in Wynne.
105 See infra Part III.A (discussing Justice Scalia’s criticism of the dormant Commerce Clause); 
infra Part III.B (discussing Justice Thomas’ criticism of the dormant Commerce Clause).
106 Adam Liptak, Thomas Is Getting a New Chance to Break Precedent (if not Silence), N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2014, at A15.
107 E.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 271 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Justice Thomas, on 
the other hand, believes that the Constitution expressly proscribes the states from levying taxes that 
facially discriminate against interstate commerce under a different clause, the Import-Export Clause.
See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted) (“[T]he Constitution [seems] to provide an express check on the States’ 
power to levy certain discriminatory taxes on the commerce of other states—not in the judicially 
created negative Commerce Clause, but in the Art. I, § 10, Import-Export Clause, our decision in 
Woodruff v. Parham notwithstanding.”).
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A. The Late Justice Scalia
The late Justice Scalia abhorred the dormant Commerce Clause, but 
was willing to both (1) use the doctrine to strike down facially 
discriminatory state laws,108 and (2) refuse to overturn dormant Commerce 
Clause holdings in the spirit of stare decisis—especially because Congress 
could intervene via legislation to overturn such decisions.109
Notwithstanding his concurrence in Quill,110 Justice Scalia consistently
articulated his displeasure with the dormant Commerce Clause in state tax 
cases.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., Justice Scalia 
concurred in the Court’s opinion that an Oklahoma sales tax on the full 
price of a bus ticket purchased for interstate travel was consistent with the 
Commerce Clause.111 Unlike the Court, however, Justice Scalia did not 
analyze the tax under the Complete Auto test.112 He believed the tax was 
constitutional solely because it did not facially discriminate against 
interstate commerce.113 Justice Scalia used the opportunity to mock both 
the dormant Commerce Clause114 and the Complete Auto test—the latter of 
which he called “eminently unhelpful.”115 He ultimately implied that the 
dormant Commerce Clause is a counterfeit, illegitimate subversion of 
congressional authority.116
Likewise, in Wynne, Justice Scalia dissented to excoriate the dormant 
Commerce Clause.117 He called the doctrine a “judicial fraud” and a 
                                                                                                                         
108 Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 271 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also POMP, supra note 6, at 1-6 n.26 
(“Justice Scalia would not . . . have upheld a tax that discriminated against interstate commerce.”).
109 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 320 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted) (“I would not revisit the merits of [the Commerce Clause holding of Bellas Hess], but would 
adhere to it on the basis of stare decisis. Congress has the final say over regulation of interstate 
commerce, and it can change the rule of Bellas Hess by simply saying so. We have long recognized that 
the doctrine of stare decisis has ‘special force’ where ‘Congress remains free to alter what we have 
done.’”). The idea that the command of stare decisis is even stronger when Congress is free to act is a 
curious argument to hear from an originalist. For further discussion of the Court’s now defunct physical 
presence nexus standard for state sales and use tax collection (which is beyond the scope of this Note), 
see Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, supra note 72.
110 Quill, 504 U.S. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200–01 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
concurring).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See id. at 200 (“That seems to me the most we can demand to certify compliance with the 
‘negative Commerce Clause’—which is ‘negative’ not only because it negates state regulation of 
commerce, but also because it does not appear in the Constitution.”).
115 Id. at 201.
116 See id. (“Under the real Commerce Clause . . . it is for Congress to make the judgment that 
interstate commerce must be immunized from certain sorts of nondiscriminatory state action . . . .”).
117 See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“The principal purpose of my writing separately is to point out how wrong our negative 
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“brazen invention.”118 In paradigmatic Scalia fashion, he chastised the 
majority for its (albeit correct)119 statement that the doctrine has “deep 
roots” in the Court’s jurisprudence.120 He further lambasted the Complete 
Auto test—particularly the concept of internal consistency—for its “ad 
hocery.”121
These opinions shed some light on the late Justice Scalia’s position on 
Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause. Justice Scalia believed
that, when Congress does not legislate on a particular subject, the states are 
permitted to regulate interstate commerce via facially neutral statutes.122
Instead of courts analyzing such laws under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, Justice Scalia would have preferred Congress to be the final 
arbiter. In his view, if Congress believes that a state regulation 
impermissibly burdens interstate commerce, it can simply preempt the state 
law at issue.123 Under this interpretation of the Commerce Clause, courts
should not apply the Complete Auto test because such determinations are 
legislative tasks for Congress to undertake.
B. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas rejects the dormant Commerce Clause perhaps to an 
even greater degree than the late Justice Scalia.124 He is also much more 
skeptical of stare decisis than his former colleague.125
Justice Thomas has openly expressed self-deprecatory regret for 
writing and joining dormant Commerce Clause opinions early in his tenure 
                                                                                                                         
commerce clause jurisprudence is in the first place, and how well today’s decision illustrates its 
error.”).
118 Id. at 1808.
119 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 13 (1824) (explaining that the states have no general 
concurrent commerce powers and that Congress’ commerce authority reigns supreme over that of the 
states’ in certain circumstances).
120 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“The Court claims that 
the [dormant Commerce Clause] ‘has deep roots.’ So it does, like many weeds.”).
121 Id. at 1809.
122 See id. at 1808 (“The [Commerce] Clause says nothing about prohibiting state laws that burden 
commerce. Much less does it say anything about authorizing judges to set aside state laws they believe
burden commerce.”).
123 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 201 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Under the real Commerce Clause . . . it is for Congress to make the judgment that 
interstate commerce must be immunized from certain sorts of nondiscriminatory state action—a
judgment that may embrace (as ours ought not) such imponderables as how much ‘value [is] fairly 
attributable to economic activity within the taxing State,’ and what constitutes ‘fair relation between a 
tax and the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer by the State.’”).
124 See, e.g., POMP, supra note 6, at 1-6 n.26 (“Justice Scalia would not . . . have upheld a tax that 
discriminated against interstate commerce . . . [,] but Justice Thomas apparently would.”).
125 Justice Scalia himself even stated that Justice Thomas “does not believe in stare decisis,
period.” Liptak, supra note 106, at A15.
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on the Court.126 In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of 
Harrison,127 he took his “leave of the ‘dormant’ Commerce Clause” 
because, in his words, “it ceased to make sense to [him].”128 In his Wayfair
concurrence, Justice Thomas acknowledged that he should have joined 
Justice Byron White’s dissent in Quill. That is, “adher[ing] to [dormant 
Commerce Clause] jurisprudence in [that case]” by joining Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence was something he would never do today.129 Now, he rejects 
“the Court’s entire negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”130
While typically employing a less vicious and sarcastic tone than the 
late Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas has similarly expressed disdain toward 
the dormant Commerce Clause in his opinions. He has referred to dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as “overbroad,” “unnecessary,” and 
“unmoored from any constitutional text.”131 Additionally, he has argued 
that the doctrine “has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little 
sense, and [is] virtually unworkable.”132
Justice Thomas diverges from the late Justice Scalia in his view that 
even facially discriminatory state tax laws do not offend the Commerce 
Clause. According to Justice Thomas, the Court’s interpretation that the 
Commerce Clause has an implicit negative command is inconsistent with 
the original meaning of the Constitution and thus the Court should never
apply the doctrine.133 He believes instead that another constitutional 
provision, the Import-Export Clause, explicitly proscribes facially 
discriminatory state taxation of interstate commerce.134 Justice Thomas 
views the original meaning of that clause as prohibiting states from levying 
tariffs not only on goods imported from, or exported to, foreign nations, 
                                                                                                                         
126 See Clarence Thomas Transcript, Conversations with Bill Kristol, https://perma.cc/G9VN-
A7FU (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) (“[W]hen I got to the Court, I wrote some ‘dormant’ Commerce 
Clause opinions; I went along with them because I [had not] thought it through.”).
127 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
128 Clarence Thomas Transcript, supra note 126.
129 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
Presumably, Justice Thomas will never again write an opinion striking down a state law under the 
dormant Commerce Clause as he did in Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envt’l Quality of State of Or., 
511 U.S. 93 (1994).
130 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100.
131 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132 Id.
133 See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 237 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Though 
the Court has properly applied our dormant Commerce Clause precedents, I continue to adhere to my 
view that ‘[t]he negative commerce clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little 
sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application, and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis 
for striking down a state statute.’”).
134 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted) (“[T]he Constitution [seems] to provide an express check on the States’ power to levy certain 
discriminatory taxes on the commerce of other States—not in the judicially created negative Commerce 
Clause, but in the Art. I, § 10, Import-Export Clause, our decision in Woodruff v. Parham,
notwithstanding.”).
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but also other states.135 He opines that, to the Framers of the Constitution, 
the terms “import” and “export” referred to trade amongst the states as well 
as with foreign nations.136
C. Justice Gorsuch
Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court in 2017, Justice 
Gorsuch served as a judge on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. As a 
circuit court judge, he was bound to follow Supreme Court precedent,
making it impermissible for him to disregard the dormant Commerce 
Clause.
Nonetheless, in Energy and Environment Legal Institute v. Epel,137
then-Judge Gorsuch mentioned the common criticisms of the doctrine.138
Arguably,139 the context of his Epel opinion shows that then-Judge 
Gorsuch positively acknowledged these criticisms by not dismissing them 
outright for being outside mainstream legal thought (as Justice Alito did in 
Wynne).140 Additionally, in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl (at the 
Tenth Circuit), then-Judge Gorsuch took an interesting jab at the doctrine, 
referring to it as “anything but dormant” because courts often employ it to 
strike down state legislation even absent congressional preemption.141
While Justice Gorsuch certainly aligns with many conservative legal 
theories,142 opposition to the dormant Commerce Clause is one that divides 
the Court’s conservative bloc. In Wayfair, his first dormant Commerce
Clause case as a Supreme Court Justice, Justice Gorsuch could have 
clarified his views with respect to the doctrine.143 Instead, he simply 
reiterated his previously expressed qualms144 and decided that the overall 
                                                                                                                         
135 Id. at 621.
136 Id.
137 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015).
138 See id. at 1171 (citations omitted) (“Detractors find dormant commerce clause doctrine absent 
from the Constitution’s text and incompatible with its structure. But as an inferior court we take 
Supreme Court precedent as we find it and dormant commerce clause jurisprudence remains very much 
alive today . . . .”).
139 This Author believes that the context of the Epel opinion shows that then-Judge Gorsuch is 
implicitly criticizing the dormant Commerce Clause by explicitly mentioning the common criticisms of 
the doctrine.
140 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1809 (2015).
141 Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
142 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Justice Gorsuch’s First Opinions Reveal a Confident Textualist,
WASH. POST, June 23, 2017 (“Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch has written three opinions . . . . All three 
show the Supreme Court’s newest justice to be a confident, committed textualist with a distinctive 
writing style . . . .”). Justice Gorsuch also harbors deep skepticism of the Chevron doctrine, which even 
the late Justice Scalia favored. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). Like the dormant Commerce Clause, Chevron is a judicially created doctrine.
143 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100–01 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
144 See id. (“My agreement with the Court’s discussion of the history of our dormant [C]ommerce 
[C]lause jurisprudence, however, should not be mistaken for agreement with all aspects of the doctrine. 
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legitimacy of the doctrine is a “question[] for another day.”145
IV. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY OF MARYLAND V. WYNNE
A. Background
Brian and Karen Wynne, a wealthy Maryland couple, conducted 
business via a pass-through entity, and filed income tax returns in thirty-
nine states.146 As residents of Maryland, that State taxed the Wynnes on 
their worldwide income. Additionally, the other states in which the 
Wynnes conducted business taxed them on income sourced in those states.
The Maryland personal income tax scheme that the Wynnes 
challenged, in the words of Justice Alito, was rather “unusual.”147
Maryland imposed both a progressive “State” income tax and a flat 
“county” income tax that varied in rate.148 Maryland also taxed 
nonresidents on their Maryland sourced income.149 The State required 
nonresidents subject to the State income tax, but not the county income tax,
to pay a “special nonresident” tax.150 Maryland applied this tax at the 
lowest county income tax rate.151
Maryland allowed taxpayers a credit for income taxes paid to other 
states against the State income tax, but not the county income tax.152 The 
Wynnes challenged this aspect of the statute as unconstitutional as applied 
in their specific case.153
Because they paid so much in income taxes to other states, the Wynnes 
had an excess credit that they argued should have reduced (or eliminated) 
their Maryland county income tax. For example, assume the Wynnes paid 
$100,000 in income taxes to other states and owed Maryland $100,000 in 
income taxes—$68,000 on the State portion and $32,000 on the county 
portion. They would use $68,000 of their $100,000 credit for income taxes 
                                                                                                                         
The Commerce Clause is found in Article I and authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 
Meanwhile, our dormant commerce cases suggest Article III courts may invalidate state laws that 
offend no congressional statute. Whether and how much of this can be squared with the text of the 
Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or defended as misbranded products of federalism or 
antidiscrimination imperatives flowing from Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause are 
questions for another day.”).
145 Id. at 2101.
146 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1793 (2015).
147 Id. at 1792.
148 Id. The county income tax rates ranged from 1.25% to 3.2%. Walter Hellerstein, Deciphering 
the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Wynne, 2015 J. TAX’N 4, 5 (2015).
149 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
150 Id.
151 Id. Therefore, the special nonresident tax rate was 1.25%. Hellerstein, Deciphering the 
Supreme Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 149.
152 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
153 Id. at 1793.
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paid to other states to eliminate the State portion of the Maryland income 
tax. Maryland, however, would not allow the Wynnes to use their excess 
credit of $32,000 to eliminate the county portion of its income tax.
The Maryland Tax Court held for the State, but the Circuit Court for 
Howard County reversed and held that the Maryland income tax scheme 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.154 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, the State’s highest court, affirmed the trial court’s holding after 
analyzing the tax under Complete Auto.155 The State’s highest court held 
that the tax was both internally inconsistent and discriminatory.156 In so 
ruling, Maryland’s highest court originally held that the tax was 
discriminatory because of Maryland’s refusal to permit a credit for income 
taxes paid to other states against the county income tax, but later clarified 
that the State could use another “method of apportionment” to remedy this 
constitutional defect.157
B. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court, with Justice Alito writing for a 5-4
majority (a closer decision than many expected),158 held that the Maryland 
income tax scheme “[had] the same economic effect as a state tariff,”
which is the “quintessential evil targeted by the dormant Commerce 
Clause.”159 Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of Maryland’s 
highest court and held that the State’s income tax scheme was 
unconstitutional.160
The Court analyzed the Maryland income tax scheme doctrinally under
Complete Auto.161 The Court’s analysis specifically focused on the internal 
consistency test,162 with Justice Alito cogently articulating the internal 
                                                                                                                         
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See Donald Williamson & Michelle M. Hobbs, The Constitution’s Dormant Commerce Clause 
Limits the Power of States to Tax Their Residents—Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Brian 
Wynne et ux., AM. U. KOGOD SCH. OF BUS. RES. 1 (2015) (emphasis added) (“On May 18, the Supreme 
Court in a surprisingly close 5-4 decision found that Maryland’s failure to grant a credit against its 
county income tax for out-of-state income taxes paid by Maryland residents violates the Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause.”). The four dissenters (Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan) were strange 
bedfellows. This Author believes that these four justices voted together to uphold the Maryland income 
tax scheme because Justices Scalia and Thomas abhor the dormant Commerce Clause, whereas Justices 
Ginsburg and Kagan are political liberals who support expansive state taxing power. The dormant 
Commerce Clause a priori restricts a state’s taxing power. It would appear that judicial originalists and 
political liberals have reason to agree on this issue.
159 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1803. The Court eschewed a traditional analysis of all four factors of Complete Auto,
simply analyzing the Maryland tax scheme under the internal consistency test.
162 See id. (“The Maryland income tax scheme fails the internal consistency test.”).
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inconsistency of the tax:
A simple example illustrates [that Maryland’s income tax 
scheme is internally inconsistent]. Assume that every State 
imposed the following taxes, which are similar to Maryland’s 
“county” and “special nonresident” taxes: (1) a 1.25% tax on 
income that residents earn in State, (2) a 1.25% tax on 
income that residents earn in other jurisdictions, and (3) a 
1.25% tax on income that nonresidents earn in State. Assume 
further that two taxpayers, April and Bob, both live in State 
A, but that April earns her income in State A whereas Bob
earns his income in State B. In this circumstance, Bob will 
pay more income tax than April solely because he earns 
income interstate. Specifically, April will have to pay a 
1.25% tax only once, to State A. But Bob will have to pay a 
1.25% tax twice: once to State A, where he resides, and once 
to State B, where he earns the income.163
The Court also held that Maryland’s income tax scheme impermissibly 
discriminated against interstate commerce by demonstrating how a person 
earning income derived from interstate commerce would bear a greater
total income tax burden than one earning income purely intrastate.164 This 
finding is rather unsurprising as an internally inconsistent tax is inherently
discriminatory.165
Additionally, the Court responded to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 
assertion that the internal consistency test “requires a State taxing based on 
residence to ‘recede’ to a State taxing based on source.”166 For example, 
Justice Ginsburg was concerned that the Court’s holding would compel 
Maryland to “limit its residence-based taxation” if it also chose “to 
exercise, to the full extent, its source-based authority [to tax].”167 To 
establish internal consistency, Maryland would have to either: (1) grant a 
credit for income taxes paid to other states against the county portion of its 
income tax, (2) solely tax Maryland sourced income, or (3) eliminate the 
special nonresident tax. All three options would prevent the State from 
exercising unfettered authority to tax based on both residence and source.
Following the lead of Maryland’s highest court, the Court attempted to 
rebuff (but did not directly address) Justice Ginsburg’s claim. Justice Alito 
                                                                                                                         
163 Id. at 1803–04.
164 See id. at 1805 (“The critical point is that the total tax burden on interstate commerce is higher, 
not that Maryland may receive more or less tax revenue from a particular taxpayer.”).
165 See supra Section II.C.3.
166 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1805 (citations omitted) (Justice Ginsburg’s “dissent claims that the 
[internal consistency] analysis requires a State taxing based on residence to ‘recede’ to a State taxing 
based on source. We establish no such rule of priority.”).
167 Id. at 1813–14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2018] LESSONS FROM WYNNE 1101
simply refused to “foreclose the possibility” that a state could employ 
methods other than offering a credit to remedy an internally inconsistent 
tax.168 The Court declared, however, that allowing a credit against the 
county income tax would make Maryland’s income tax scheme internally 
consistent.169
While not rigorously examined in the opinion,170 the Court additionally 
held that the Maryland county income tax was an extension of the State 
taxing regime—a holding integral to the outcome of the case.171 This 
important concept is relevant to this Note, as the New York City income 
tax (like the Maryland county income tax) is merely a creature of the New 
York State taxing regime.172
C. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reads more like a policy paper than a 
rigorous doctrinal legal opinion, and contains multiple misstatements of 
law.173 Nonetheless, Justice Ginsburg indicated a fact that is important to 
this Note: Maryland’s income tax scheme would achieve internal 
consistency if the State were to repeal the special nonresident tax.174
In her first error, Justice Ginsburg conflated a state’s authority to tax 
its own residents under the Due Process Clause with its obligations 
                                                                                                                         
168 Id. at 1806 (majority opinion).
169 Id. at 1805. Besides allowing a credit, the Court offers no other explicit method of making the 
tax in question internally consistent. See id. at 1806 (citations omitted) (“But while Maryland could 
cure the problem with its current system by granting a credit for taxes paid to other States, we do not 
foreclose the possibility that it could comply with the Commerce Clause in some other way. Of course, 
we do not decide the constitutionality of a hypothetical tax scheme that Maryland might adopt because 
such a scheme is not before us.”). The most obvious way of making the tax internally consistent 
without offering a credit would be to repeal the special nonresident tax (as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
explains). Id. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Maryland could also create internal consistency 
without providing a credit if it only taxed Maryland sourced income. Nonetheless, the context of the 
majority opinion implies that if a state adopts a credit, it must extend that credit against the county 
portion of its income tax.
170 This issue is not rigorously examined in the opinion because the conclusion is clear. See id. at 
1792 (majority opinion) (explaining that the county income tax is part of the State income tax despite 
its label).
171 This explains Justice Alito’s placement of quotation marks around the word “county” and his 
additional references to the tax as a so-called “county” tax throughout the opinion. See, e.g., id.
(internal citations omitted) (“The income tax that Maryland imposes upon its own residents has two 
parts: a ‘state’ income tax, which is set at a graduated rate, and a so-called ‘county’ income tax, which 
is set at a rate that varies by county but is capped at 3.2%. Despite the names that Maryland has 
assigned to these taxes, both are State taxes, and both are collected by the State’s Comptroller of the 
Treasury.”).
172 See infra Section V.A.
173 Described and examined in this Part, infra.
174 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This is precisely the structure of the New 
York City income tax. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1302(a) (McKinney 2018) (providing that New York City 
does not tax nonresidents).
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regarding such taxation under the Commerce Clause.175 Under the Due 
Process Clause, a state indisputably may tax its residents on their 
worldwide income.176 The Commerce Clause, however, requires that such 
taxation be fairly apportioned and non-discriminatory, inter alia.177
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg referenced Justice Thurgood Marshall’s 
erroneous dictum in Goldberg v. Sweet178—that “[i]t is not . . . a purpose of 
the Commerce Clause to protect state residents from their own state 
taxes.”179 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg distinguished gross receipts taxes 
from income taxes—a distinction the Court has long since discarded for 
most purposes.180
The most relevant recognition in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent (at least for 
the purposes of this Note) is that Maryland’s income tax scheme could 
achieve internal consistency even without allowing the Wynnes a credit for 
income taxes paid to other states against the county portion of the State 
income tax.181 Instead, the State could simply repeal the special 
nonresident tax.182 This appalled Justice Ginsburg,183 but the majority
dismissed it as an example of the multiple options available for a state to 
remedy unconstitutional discrimination—a concept known as either 
“level[ing] up” or “level[ing] down” in light of a constitutional infirmity.184
D. The Anti-Dormant Commerce Clause Dissents
As expected, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas used Wynne as
another opportunity to condemn the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice 
                                                                                                                         
175 Id. at 1813 (internal citation omitted) (“Today’s decision veers from a principle of interstate 
and international taxation repeatedly acknowledged by this Court: A nation or State ‘may tax all the 
income of its residents, even income earned outside the taxing jurisdiction.’”).
176 See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920) (“As to residents [a state] may, and does, exert its 
taxing power over their [worldwide] income . . . ”).
177 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
178 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989).
179 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court abandoned this dictum in W.
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 203 (1994) (“State taxes are ordinarily paid by in-state 
businesses and consumers, yet if they discriminate against out-of-state products, they are 
unconstitutional.”).
180 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1796 (citations omitted) (“The discarded distinction between taxes on 
gross receipts and net income was based on the notion, endorsed in some early cases, that a tax on gross 
receipts is an impermissible ‘direct and immediate burden’ on interstate commerce, whereas a tax on 
net income is merely an ‘indirect and incidental’ burden.”).
181 See id. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Because it is the interaction between [the “county” 
income tax and the “special nonresident” tax] that renders Maryland’s tax scheme internally 
inconsistent, Maryland could eliminate the inconsistency by terminating the special nonresident tax . . . 
.”).
182 Id.
183 See id. (“There is, moreover, a deep flaw in the Court’s chosen test . . . Maryland could . . . 
bring itself into compliance with the test at the heart of the Court’s analysis without removing the 
double tax burden the test is purportedly designed to ‘cure.’”).
184 Id. at 1806 (majority opinion).
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Scalia took his last stand against the doctrine in this dissent, as he passed 
away shortly thereafter.185 Ever so artfully,186 Justice Scalia took the 
doctrine apart. He referred to it as a “judge-invented” rule,187 and used 
numerous witty adjectives to display his scorn for the doctrine—calling it 
“[s]ynthetic,” “[i]maginary,” “incoherent,” and a “brazen invention.”188
As usual, Justice Thomas adopted a more civil approach in displaying 
his displeasure with the dormant Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, Justice 
Thomas occasionally employed sarcasm in his historical analysis of 
income taxation at the time of the Founding.189 He distinguished the 
dormant Commerce Clause from the “actual Commerce Clause,”190
doubting that the doctrine truly exists.191 Overall, this dissent was nothing 
new from Justice Thomas. The opinion contained citations to his previous 
dissents and concurrences in dormant Commerce Clause cases,192 and
simply cemented his unique jurisprudential purity in opposition to the 
doctrine.193
V. THE NEW YORK CITY INCOME TAX IN LIGHT OF THE WYNNE
HOLDING
A. The New York Income Tax Statute
New York State levies a personal income tax194 consistent with the 
                                                                                                                         
185 Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 
2016, at A1.
186 At one point, he even invoked the famous philosopher Immanuel Kant to mock the internal 
consistency test. See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1809 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“How did this exercise in 
counterfactuals find its way into our basic charter? The test, it is true, bears some resemblance to 
Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative: ‘Act only according to the maxim whereby you 
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ without contradiction.”).
187 Id. at 1807. Justice Scalia is absolutely correct—the dormant Commerce Clause does not 
explicitly appear in the Constitution. Obviously (as the Court still applies the doctrine), the majority of 
the Court disagrees with Justice Scalia’s belief that this judicial invention is dangerous.
188 See id. at 1810–11 (referring to the dormant Commerce Clause as both the “Synthetic 
Commerce Clause” and the “Imaginary Commerce Clause”); id. at 1808 (referring to the doctrine as 
“incoherent” and a “brazen invention”). Justice Scalia was much less flamboyant in his criticism of the 
doctrine in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Wash. St. Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987). See id. at 
254–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the flaws of the internal consistency test and discussing his 
opposition to the dormant Commerce Clause).
189 See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1811 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (“[T]he Court 
proves how far our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence has departed from the actual Commerce 
Clause.”); id. at 1813 (“Even if one assumed that the negative Commerce Clause existed . . .”).
190 Id. at 1811 (emphasis added).
191 See id. at 1813 (“Even if one assumed that the negative Commerce Clause existed . . . ”).
192 Id. at 1811.
193 See supra Section III.B (explaining that Justice Thomas would refuse to strike down any state 
law under the dormant Commerce Clause, even one that is facially discriminatory).
194 N.Y. TAX LAW § 601 (McKinney 2018).
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national pattern195 of taxing residents on their worldwide income196 and
nonresidents on their sourced income.197 New York also authorizes (by 
statute) cities with over one million inhabitants to levy a city income tax.198
While New York provides taxpayers a credit for income taxes paid to other 
states against the State income tax,199 it does not allow its resident 
taxpayers to credit income taxes paid to other states against the City 
income tax.200
Without statutory authorization from the State, New York City would 
not have the power to tax.201 The New York Court of Appeals has held that 
under the New York Constitution: (1) “[t]he power to tax . . . rests solely 
with the Legislature;”202 (2) “the exclusive power of taxation is lodged in 
the State Legislature;”203 (3) “municipalities such as the City of New York 
have no inherent taxing power, but only that which is delegated by the 
State;”204 and (4) “[a]ll taxing power in the State of New York is vested in 
the Legislature pursuant to section 1 of article III and section 1 of article 
XVI of [the] State Constitution.”205 While the State’s taxing power is 
exclusive, “[t]he Legislature [can] . . . delegate authority to assess and 
collect taxes to a city . . .,”206 but “th[at] delegation of State taxing power . . 
. must be made in express terms by enabling legislation.”207 New York 
State exercises this exact power of delegation by permitting New York 
City to impose a personal income tax via statute.208 Therefore, the City 
income tax is part of, not independent of, the State income tax and thus 
directly subject to the ruling in Wynne, as there is no distinction between 
                                                                                                                         
195 MORGAN SCARBORO, TAX FOUNDATION, STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES AND 
BRACKETS FOR 2018 (2018), https://taxfoundation.org/state-individual-income-tax-rates-brackets-2018/
(“Forty-three states levy individual income taxes.”).
196 N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 611(a), 612(a) (McKinney 2018).
197 Id. § 631(a).
198 Id. § 1301(a)(1).
199 Id. § 620.
200 See id. § 1310 (listing permissible credits against income taxes imposed by cities, which does 
not include income taxes paid to other states).
201 See Castle Oil Corp. v. City of N.Y., 675 N.E. 2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1996) (“Under our form of 
State government, the exclusive power of taxation is lodged in the State Legislature. A corollary to this 
basic rule is that municipalities such as the City of New York have no inherent taxing power, but only 
that which is delegated by the State.”) (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; id. art. IX, § 2).
202 City of N.Y. v. State of N.Y., 730 N.E. 2d 920, 925 (N.Y. 2000); see also Greater 
Poughkeepsie Library Dist. v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 618 N.E. 2d 127, 130 (N.Y. 1993) (“The power 
to tax, of course, lies solely with the Legislature. This power is inherent in our form of government and 
justified by legislative accountability to the electorate.”).
203 Castle Oil Corp. v. City of N.Y., 675 N.E. 2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1996).
204 Id.
205 Sonmax, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 372 N.E. 2d 9, 11 (N.Y. 1977).
206 Id.
207 Castle Oil Corp., 675 N.E. 2d at 842.
208 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1301(a)(1) (McKinney 2018).
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state and local taxes for purposes of federal constitutional law.209
Moreover, the language of the statute authorizing New York City to 
levy a personal income tax demonstrates that the City income tax is part of 
the State taxing regime. The provision reads: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, 
any city in this state having a population of one million or 
more inhabitants, acting through its local legislative body, is 
hereby authorized and empowered to adopt and amend local 
law imposing in any such city, for taxable years beginning 
after nineteen hundred and seventy-five: a tax on the personal 
income of residents of such city, at the rates provided for 
under subsection (a) of section thirteen hundred four of this 
article. . . .210
According to this statute, New York City, like most municipalities,211 has 
no power to tax other than what the State expressly grants it.212
The administration and collection of the New York City income tax 
provide further evidence that it is inherently linked to, and part of, the State 
taxing regime. A New York City resident’s City taxable income is identical 
                                                                                                                         
209 See Walter Hellerstein, Are State and Local Taxes Constitutionally Distinguishable?, 83 ST.
TAX NOTES 1091, 1092–93 (2017) (emphasis added) (“It is well settled . . . that any action by a 
political subdivision of a state is subject to the same restraints that would be imposed on the state if the 
state itself had taken the challenged action in question. Because political subdivisions of a state are 
creatures of the state, their exercises of tax power are treated as the exercise of state tax power and 
adjudicated according to the standards restraining the exercise of state tax power. In short, that the state 
tax power is exercised by a political subdivision of the state rather than by the state itself is of no 
constitutional moment.”); Brief of Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 5 n.2, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-
485) (“The formal division by Maryland of its tax into ‘state’ and ‘county’ taxes has no effect on 
constitutional analysis.”).
210 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1301(a)(1) (McKinney 2018) (emphasis added).
211 In some states, known as “home rule states,” municipalities (in certain circumstances) are 
permitted to impose their own laws even absent express statutory approval from the state. See Jon D. 
Russell & Aaron Bostrom, Federalism, Dillon and Home Rule, WHITE PAPER 1 (2016). The majority of 
states, including New York, instead follow “Dillon’s Rule.” Id. at 8. Under Dillon’s Rule, 
municipalities may enact their own laws only when the state expressly grants them the authority to do 
so via statute. Id. at 1. Furthermore, the United States Constitution speaks only of the sovereignty of 
states, not municipalities. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added) (“The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”). While states may delegate authority to their political subdivisions, 
those subdivisions remain part of the state and are therefore subject to the same constitutional 
limitations as the state. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAINE,
STATE TAXATION § 20.10 (5)(a)(i) (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2018-1) (“Insofar as federal constitutional 
restraints limit state taxation of cross-border economic activity, it is irrelevant whether the tax in 
question is imposed by the state itself or by one of its political subdivisions (for example, a city or a 
county). The federal constitutional restraints apply in the same manner to both.”).
212 The key phrase in the statute making this clear reads, “[New York City] is hereby authorized 
and empowered” in reference to a city’s authority to levy an income tax. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1301(a)(1) 
(McKinney 2018).
1106 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:4
to his or her State taxable income.213 New York City residents pay both 
their State and City income tax to the New York State Department of 
Taxation and Finance on the same return:214 a taxpayer’s City income tax 
liability is added to the amount owed in State income tax and the total 
combined New York State and City income tax is paid in one amount to 
the State. The State then remits to the City its share of the tax.215
Throughout the entire collection process, the State remains in complete 
control. The City is passive—a mere depository for its statutory share of 
income tax revenue collected by, and paid by, the State.
Additionally, the State delivers a notice of deficiency to allegedly 
delinquent taxpayers, and conducts all appeal proceedings related to City 
income tax liability.216 New York City’s Tax Appeals Tribunal only has 
jurisdiction over taxes “administered by the City of New York.”217 The 
New York City personal income tax is “administered by the [State] and 
therefore, [is] not within the jurisdiction of the [New York City Tax 
Appeals Tribunal].”218 Likewise, the same statute of limitations applies to 
refund claims and income tax assessments related to the State and City 
income tax.219 Furthermore, all civil penalties imposed on a taxpayer for 
failure to comply with State income tax laws are similarly imposed for the 
failure to comply with City income tax laws.220 Finally, the New York 
State Department of Taxation and Finance issues regulations that apply to 
both the State and City personal income tax.221
The dispositive holdings of New York’s highest court and the indicia 
evidencing State control over the City income tax support the conclusion 
that the New York City income tax is unambiguously part of the State 
income tax. In accordance with general principles of federal constitutional 
law, the constitutionality of the New York City income tax depends not on 
whether the tax is internally consistent and non-discriminatory in isolation,
but instead on whether it is non-discriminatory when viewed in tandem 
                                                                                                                         
213 Id. § 1303.
214 Id. § 1312(a). New York City even advertises this on its own self-help website. CITY OF NEW 
YORK, NEW YORK CITY PERSONAL INCOME TAX, https://perma.cc/7MJY-7H8H (last visited Dec. 14,
2018) (“The [New York City personal income tax] is administered and collected by the New York State 
Department of Taxation and Finance.”).
215 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1313(c) (McKinney 2018).
216 Id. § 1312(a).
217 New York City Tax Appeals Tribunal Annual Report July 1, 2016–June 30, 2017, NYC TAX 
APPEALS TRIBUNAL, http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/taxappeals/downloads/pdf/annual_report_2016-
2017.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
218 Id.
219 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1312(a) (McKinney 2018).
220 Id.
221 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 290.2 (West 2018).
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with the New York State income tax.222
B. The New York City Income Tax Is Internally Consistent when Viewed 
in Isolation, but that Description Is Irrelevant to the Constitutional 
Analysis
The New York City income tax is internally consistent when viewed in 
isolation,223 which leads to confusion about the constitutionality of denying 
a credit for income taxes paid to other states. Even though New York City 
does not grant taxpayers a credit for income taxes paid to other states,224 it
refrains from taxing nonresidents225—exactly the hypothetical226 Justice 
                                                                                                                         
222 See Hellerstein, Are State and Local Taxes Constitutionally Distinguishable?, supra note 211,
at 1097 (emphasis added) (“In addition to evaluating federal constitutional restraints on state and local 
taxation of cross-border economic activity at the state level . . . one should also evaluate these restraints 
in light of the state’s tax structure as a whole. To avoid any misunderstanding of this point, it is 
important to make clear that when I say ‘evaluate the tax in light of the state tax structure as a whole,’ I 
mean only that the constitutional analysis should view the exercise of tax power by the state or its 
political subdivisions collectively rather than subjecting each state or local exaction to an 
individualized inquiry without regard to the existence of other exactions imposed under state 
authority.”).
223 Two leading scholars believe, however, that New York’s rules for determining residency are 
internally inconsistent and therefore unconstitutional. This particular issue is outside the scope of this 
Note. For an in-depth analysis of the constitutionality of New York’s tax residence rules, see Michael 
S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, New York’s Unconstitutional Tax Residence Rule, 85 ST. TAX NOTES 707 
(2017). Professor Zelinsky disagrees with important aspects of Professors Ruth Mason and Michael S. 
Knoll’s constitutional analysis. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Double Taxing Dual Residents: A Response to 
Knoll and Mason, 86 ST. TAX NOTES 677, 678 (2017) (“I am thus less eager than Knoll and Mason to 
deploy Wynne and the dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination principle to remedy the double 
state income taxation of dual residents. It would be best for this problem to be solved by Congress or 
by the states themselves.”). For Professors Mason and Knoll’s response to Professor Zelinsky’s 
argument, see Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, Dual Residents: A Sur-Reply to Zelinsky, 87 ST. TAX 
NOTES 269 (2018).  
224 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1310 (McKinney 2018) (listing permissible credits against income taxes 
imposed by cities, which does not include income taxes paid to other states).
225 Id. § 1302(a). New York City used to tax nonresidents via a “Commuter Tax.” See New York’s 
Highest Court Holds Commuter Tax Unconstitutional, ROBERTS & HOLLAND LLP, Apr. 4, 2000, 
https://www.robertsandholland.com/news-page?itemid=87 (“For more than 30 years the New York 
City ‘Commuter Tax’ was imposed on individuals who worked in New York City but lived 
elsewhere.”). Legislators from upstate New York succeeded in eliminating the Commuter Tax, but only 
for nonresidents of New York City who were New York State residents. See id. (“[B]owing to the 
exigencies of a tight Rockland County election, the State passed legislation to repeal the Commuter 
Tax for individuals living in the New York suburbs.”). Under the amended Commuter Tax, New York 
City nonresidents living in, say, Connecticut or New Jersey (and working in New York City) were 
subject to the Commuter Tax, but New York City nonresidents living elsewhere in New York State 
(and working in New York City) were not. See id. (“Individuals who worked in the City but lived in 
New Jersey, Connecticut, or any other state were still required to pay the tax.”). The New York Court 
of Appeals held the amended Commuter Tax unconstitutional under both the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. City of N.Y. v. State of N.Y., 94 N.Y. 2d 577, 596, 598 
(N.Y. 2000). Instead of reinstating the original Commuter Tax, the State decided to repeal it altogether.  
Thus, New York City no longer taxes nonresidents.
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Ginsburg raised in her Wynne dissent.227
A simple example illustrates why the New York City income tax is
internally consistent when viewed in isolation, and how New York City’s 
decision not to tax nonresidents creates this internal consistency. Assume 
two unmarried taxpayers (Avril and Rob) are both residents of New York 
City. Avril earns $1,000,000 solely in New York City, whereas Rob earns 
$1,000,000 solely in a neighboring city, Newark, New Jersey. The 
assumption under the internal consistency test is that Newark has an 
identical income tax statute to that of New York City (if viewed in 
isolation)—that is, it does not tax nonresidents like Rob.
Under the New York State income tax statute, both taxpayers pay New 
York City income tax at an average rate of approximately 3.9 percent.228
Thus, Avril and Rob each pay $39,000 in income taxes to New York 
City.229 Avril, who is engaged in intrastate commerce, would bear an equal 
income tax burden as Rob, who is engaged in interstate commerce.230
                                                                                                                         
226 See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1822 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Because it is the interaction between [the county income tax and the special nonresident 
tax] that renders Maryland’s tax scheme internally inconsistent, Maryland could eliminate the 
inconsistency by terminating the special nonresident tax . . .”). For example, if Maryland were to repeal 
the special nonresident tax (as Justice Ginsburg suggests in this hypothetical), only Maryland residents 
would pay the county income tax. Nonresidents would pay the State income tax on their Maryland 
sourced income, but would not pay the county income tax at all. Similarly, New York State taxes 
nonresidents on income sourced in the State, but does not subject nonresidents to the City income tax 
(even on income sourced in New York City). Thus, the structure of Justice Ginsburg’s hypothetical 
Maryland income tax scheme is identical to that of the actual New York income tax scheme.
227 See supra Section IV.C (analyzing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Wynne). This Author remains 
skeptical that Justice Ginsburg’s so-called hypothetical was truly hypothetical. Justice Ginsburg was 
born in Brooklyn, graduated from Columbia Law School, and lived in New York City during law 
school. Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE UNITED STATES, https://perma.cc/C5SN-7UFU (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2018). Her husband was the renowned tax lawyer Martin Ginsburg who practiced law at Weil, 
Gotshal & Manges—a prominent law firm founded and headquartered in New York City. T. Rees 
Shapiro, Martin D. Ginsburg Dies at 78; Tax Law Expert, Supreme Court Spouse, WASH. POST (June 
28, 2010), https://perma.cc/9QFT-ET25. Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg and her husband litigated (and 
won) a famous tax case regarding gender discrimination in which the Tenth Circuit held a provision of 
the Internal Revenue Code unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. Moritz v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1972). Justice Ginsburg most likely has at least some 
knowledge of the New York City income tax because she probably paid it.
228 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1304(a)(3)(A) (McKinney 2018); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN.,
NEW YORK CITY TAX RATE SCHEDULE, https://perma.cc/T66J-C8M5 (last visited Dec. 14, 2018). 
Under this subsection, resident unmarried taxpayers who earn over $50,000 owe “$1,813 plus 3.876% 
of excess over $50,000” to New York City in income taxes—approximately a 3.9 percent average tax 
rate. Id. For simplicity purposes, all examples herein will assume that Avril and Rob do not take any 
deductions. 
229 Rob is assumed to owe no income tax to Newark on his Newark sourced income. In an internal 
consistency inquiry, that City, like New York City, is presumed to refrain from taxing nonresidents 
altogether.
230 After Wynne and Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, it is clear that Rob is 
engaged in interstate commerce. See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 
1804 (2015) (emphasis added) (referencing the Maryland income tax scheme’s “discriminatory 
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Consequently, the New York City income tax, taken in isolation, is 
internally consistent. Despite its label, however, the New York City 
income tax is part of the State income tax system. Therefore, the preceding 
inquiry is misleading because it is constitutionally irrelevant.
C. The Internally Consistent New York City Income Tax is Nonetheless 
Discriminatory when Viewed in Tandem with the State Income Tax
An internally consistent tax can nonetheless be discriminatory—a
proposition that was not before the Court in Wynne.231 A finding of internal 
consistency does not automatically end the constitutional inquiry. Even 
though the New York income tax scheme is internally consistent, New 
York’s refusal to allow a credit for income taxes paid to other states against 
the City portion of its State income tax nonetheless discriminates against 
interstate commerce, violating the third prong of Complete Auto. An 
analysis of the Court’s discrimination case law, the economic analysis the 
Court endorsed in Wynne, and the relevant scholarly literature that supports
this conclusion follows.
1. The Discrimination Case Law
The third prong of Complete Auto—the discrimination prong—focuses 
on a tax’s practical effects as opposed to its inherent structure, which is the 
subject of the internal consistency doctrine developed under the 
apportionment prong. Recognizing this important distinction, the Supreme 
Court, lower federal courts, and state courts have held internally consistent 
state tax provisions unconstitutional under Complete Auto’s discrimination
prong.
For example, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                         
treatment of interstate commerce,” implying that the Wynnes’ activities constituted interstate 
commerce); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 573 (1997) 
(explaining that the “transportation of persons across state lines . . . has long been recognized as a form
of ‘commerce.’”).
231 See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN, HELLERSTEIN & SWAINE, supra note 213, at § 8.02(1)(ia)(ii) (3d ed. 
2001 & Supp. 2018-1) (explaining that “a fair reading” of the cases cited by the Wynne majority “does 
not support the proposition that ‘internal consistency’ is the exclusive test . . . for determining the risk 
of the exposure to unconstitutional multiple tax burdens under the dormant Commerce Clause.”); id. §
8.02(1)(ia)(i) (emphasis added) (“If the Court believes that Moorman controls the outcome in Wynne,
then internal consistency may well be a sine qua non of a claim that a tax that creates the risk of 
multiple taxation is prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause in a post-Wynne world. But if Wynne
is so read, it reflects a significant departure from our prior precedent.”). Professor Zelinsky, while 
skeptical of the Court’s state tax discrimination jurisprudence, acknowledges that the internal 
consistency test is better served as a test of fair apportionment than as a test of discrimination. Zelinsky, 
supra note 90, at 810–12. For a further explanation of Professor Zelinsky’s skepticism of the dormant 
Commerce Clause non-discrimination principle, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Essay, The Incoherence of 
Dormant Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Denning, 77 MISS. L.J. 653
(2007).
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Court held that a corporate franchise tax credit measured by the amount of 
exports shipped from an in-state location discriminated against interstate 
export shipping and therefore offended the dormant Commerce Clause.232
The Court explained that the credit “ha[d] the effect of treating differently 
parent corporations that are similarly situated in all respects except for the 
percentage of their . . . shipping activities conducted from New York.”233
In so doing, the “tax scheme ‘provide[d] a positive incentive for increased 
business activity in New York State,’ . . . but also . . . penalize[d] increases 
in the [corporation’s] shipping activities in other States.”234 This tax 
provision, albeit discriminatory, would nonetheless be internally consistent
because if every state adopted an identical credit, a corporation shipping 
products from any state would receive the same corporate franchise tax 
treatment.
Additionally, in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held 
that an Ohio corporate franchise tax credit for “purchases [of] new 
manufacturing machinery and equipment . . . [that] are installed in 
[Ohio]”235 discriminated against interstate commerce, violating the 
dormant Commerce Clause.236 The court agreed with the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the investment tax credit “discriminate[d] against interstate 
economic activity by coercing businesses already subject to the Ohio 
franchise tax to expand locally rather than out-of-state.”237 This tax 
provision, like that in Westinghouse, is nevertheless internally consistent. If 
every state adopted an identical credit, a corporation purchasing new 
manufacturing machinery and equipment would receive the credit 
regardless of where that corporation decided to install the machinery and 
equipment. The credit would be internally consistent, but nonetheless 
discriminatory.
Furthermore, in Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue, the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission held that an accelerated 
depreciation deduction from the corporate income tax limited to property 
located in Wisconsin discriminated against interstate commerce.238 The 
commission explained that “the Wisconsin depreciation deduction statutes 
at issue [were] obviously ‘designed to have discriminatory economic 
                                                                                                                         
232 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 407 (1984).
233 Id. at 400.
234 Id. at 400–01.
235 Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2004).
236 Id. at 746. While the Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Cuno, it did so on 
standing grounds. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006). The Court never addressed 
the merits of the case.
237 Cuno, 386 F.3d at 743; see id. at 746 (“In short, while we may be sympathetic to efforts by the 
City of Toledo to attract industry into its economically depressed areas, we conclude that Ohio’s 
investment tax credit cannot be upheld under the [dormant Commerce Clause].”).
238 Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, Docket Nos. 91-I-100, 91-I-101, 91-I-102,
1993 WL 57202, at *3 (Wis. Tax App. Comm’n Feb. 24, 1993).
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effects’ on corporations locating property outside the state by taxing such 
corporations more heavily than those locating such property in the state.”239
The accelerated depreciation deduction in Beatrice Cheese is yet another 
internally consistent state tax provision that a court nonetheless held to be 
discriminatory. If every state enacted an identical provision, all
corporations would receive the favorable deduction for their property 
regardless of location. Thus, in an internal consistency inquiry, 
corporations engaged in interstate commerce would not bear a greater 
corporate income tax burden than corporations engaged in intrastate 
commerce, yet the court held the deduction to be discriminatory.
Likewise, in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of New York 
Department of Finance, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme 
Court held that “a corporate taxing provision of the New York City 
administrative code that disallow[ed] a[n] [accelerated] depreciation 
deduction for property placed in service out of New York, while allowing 
such a deduction for property located within New York”240 discriminated 
against interstate commerce, violating the dormant Commerce Clause.241
The court expressed that New York City’s refusal to allow an accelerated 
depreciation deduction for out-of-state property “effectively reward[ed] . . . 
in-State business by postponing the full weight of the tax . . . [and] 
provide[d] a disincentive to invest a New York business’[] resources in 
property out of State.”242 This provision, albeit discriminatory, would 
satisfy the internal consistency test. In a hypothetical world where every 
state adopted an identical tax, all corporations would receive the favorable 
deduction regardless of the state in which they placed property into service.
A New York corporation with property in New Jersey would bear no 
greater corporate franchise tax burden than a New York corporation with 
property in New York. Thus, the deduction would be internally consistent,
yet discriminatory.
As the Supreme Court explained in Boston Stock Exchange v. State 
Tax Commission, discriminatory taxes are those that “‘foreclose[] tax-
neutral decisions’ about where to transact business,”243 which is the effect 
of New York’s failure to provide a credit against the City income tax. The 
State’s refusal to extend its credit for income taxes paid to other states 
against the City income tax also bears other indicia of a discriminatory tax,
including: (1) “providing a direct commercial advantage to local 
                                                                                                                         
239 Id. at *4.
240 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Fin., 667 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (App. Div. 1997).
241 Id. at 9, 11.
242 Id. at 9–10.
243 Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State 
Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 427 (1996) (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State 
Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977)).
1112 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:4
business;”244 (2) “encourag[ing] the development of local industry by 
means of taxing measures that impose[] greater burdens on economic 
activities taking place outside the State than were placed on similar 
activities within the State;”245 (3) “[inducing] ‘business operations to be 
performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed 
elsewhere;’”246 and (4) “‘provid[ing] a positive incentive for increased 
business activity [in-state],’ [while] also . . . penaliz[ing] increase[d] 
[business activity] in other State[s].”247
The “Avril and Rob Discrimination Example” below illustrates the 
discriminatory nature of the New York income tax scheme in reality, as 
opposed to the imaginary cloned248 world of internal consistency. Assume 
two unmarried taxpayers (Avril and Rob) are both New York City 
residents. Avril earns $1,000,000 solely in New York City, whereas Rob 
earns $1,000,000 solely in another state (the “Source State”) where his 
average income tax rate is identical to that of the combined New York
State and City rates. Avril and Rob each pay New York State and City 
income tax at an average combined rate of 10.7 percent.249 Avril would pay 
$107,000 in combined income taxes to New York—$68,000 on the State
portion and $39,000 on the City portion. Rob would owe $107,000 in 
income taxes to the Source State and $107,000 in combined income taxes 
to New York pre-credit—$68,000 on the State portion and $39,000 on the 
City portion. Rob could wholly eliminate the State portion of the New 
York income tax by using $68,000 of his $107,000 credit for income taxes 
paid to the Source State. New York law, however, does not permit Rob to 
apply his excess credit of $39,000 to eliminate the City portion of the New 
                                                                                                                         
244 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 (1984).
245 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 404 (1984) (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429 
U.S. at 332).
246 Id. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 336).
247 Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business 
Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 801 (1996) (quoting Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 
400–01).
248 For the Court’s use of the term “cloning” to describe the internal consistency test, see Okla. 
Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (emphasis added) (“External 
consistency, on the other hand, looks not to the logical consequences of cloning, but to the economic 
justification for the State’s claim upon the value taxed . . .”).
249 Avril and Rob each pay New York City income tax at an average rate of approximately 3.9 
percent. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1304(a)(3)(A) (McKinney 2018); New York City Tax Rate Schedule, N.Y.
ST. DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN.,
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/it/nyc_tax_rate_schedule.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2018). 
Avril and Rob each pay New York State income tax at an average rate of approximately 6.8 percent. 
See N.Y. TAX LAW § 601(c)(1)(A) (McKinney 2018); New York State Tax Rate Schedule, N.Y. ST.
DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/it/it201i_tax_rate_schedule.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (requiring unmarried resident taxpayers with New York taxable income 
between $215,400 and $1,077,550 to pay “$13,825 plus 6.85% of excess over $215,400” in income 
taxes). Therefore, Avril and Rob each pay New York State and City income tax at a total average rate 
of 10.7 percent.
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York income tax. As a result, Rob (who is engaged in interstate commerce) 
would bear a greater total income tax burden than Avril (who is engaged in 
intrastate commerce)—Rob pays a total of $146,000 in income taxes,
whereas Avril pays a total of $107,000 in income taxes. In this simple 
example, the New York system discriminates in favor of in-state activity at 
the expense of out-of-state activity.
In its practical effects, not only is the New York income tax scheme 
essentially equivalent to an impermissible state tariff like the Maryland 
scheme in Wynne,250 but it also bears further characteristics of a state tax 
that discriminates in favor of intrastate activity. In the Avril and Rob 
Discrimination Example above, New York’s income tax favors intrastate 
commerce, which, like the discriminatory tax in Boston Stock Exchange,
prevents Rob from having a tax-neutral choice about whether to engage in 
interstate or intrastate commerce. Additionally, like the tax the Court 
deemed discriminatory in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the New York 
income tax scheme provides Avril with a direct economic advantage over 
Rob merely for earning income intrastate. It encourages Rob to earn 
income solely in New York by imposing a greater income tax burden on 
economic activities taking place out-of-state. Furthermore, like in 
Westinghouse, the New York income tax regime not only “provide[s]” Rob 
with “a positive incentive” to engage in intrastate activity, but also 
“penalizes” the activity he undertakes in other states.251 Thus, consistent 
with the Court’s discrimination case law, the New York City income tax 
discriminates against interstate commerce when viewed in tandem with the 
New York State income tax, of which it is a part.
2. The Economic Analysis the Court Endorsed in Wynne
In Wynne, the Court endorsed the “undisputed” economic analysis252
that the tax economists and Professors Ruth Mason and Michael S. Knoll
articulated in two separate amicus briefs.253 This economic analysis further 
evidences the discriminatory nature of the New York income tax regime.
Both of these amicus briefs developed a formula that establishes
whether a state tax discriminates against interstate commerce.254 Professors 
                                                                                                                         
250 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1792 (2015).
251 Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 401.
252 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804 (citing favorably the “undisputed economic analysis” explained 
in the two amicus briefs).
253 Brief of the Tax Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Comptroller of the 
Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485); Brief of Michael S. Knoll and Ruth 
Mason as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 
S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485).
254 Id. at 14; Brief of the Tax Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8–15, 
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (No. 13-485). The tax economists’ equation is identical to that of Professors 
Mason and Knoll, which is explained in greater depth and expressed as a mathematical formula in 
Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, The Economic Foundation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 103 
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Mason and Knoll refer to this formula as “Competitive Neutrality,”255
whereas Ryan Lirette and economist Alan D. Viard term it “Commerce 
Neutrality.”256 The Competitive Neutrality equation often reaches the same 
result as the internal consistency test, but it does not always.257
Importantly, “[i]nternal consistency and Com[petitive] Neutrality diverge 
if the state makes its tax rate dependent on other states’ tax policies.”258
The internal consistency test and the Competitive Neutrality framework 
thus yield different results “when a state . . . [provides a] credit . . . for 
taxes paid to other states.”259 New York State fits this description—it 
provides a partial260 credit against its income tax for income taxes paid to 
other states.261
The New York income tax system, albeit internally consistent,262 fails 
the Competitive Neutrality equation in the Avril and Rob Discrimination 
Example above. In order to satisfy Competitive Neutrality, “the sum of the 
tax rates on inbound and outbound transactions, minus an interaction term, 
must be less than or equal to the state’s tax on its intrastate transactions.”263
The interaction term is simply the inbound tax rate multiplied by the 
outbound tax rate.264 In the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example, New 
York’s tax rate on: (1) inbound transactions to New York City is 6.8 
percent,265 (2) outbound transactions from New York City is 10.7 
                                                                                                                         
VA. L. REV. 309, 323 (2017) and Ryan Lirette & Alan D. Viard, Putting the Commerce Back in the 
Dormant Commerce Clause: State Taxes, State Subsidies, and Commerce Neutrality, 24 J. L. & POL’Y
467, 483 (2016).
255 Knoll & Mason, The Economic Foundation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, supra note 
256, at 318–23.
256 Lirette & Viard, supra note 256, at 470. Lirette and Viard probably use the term “Commerce 
Neutrality” instead of Competitive Neutrality to tie the formula to the dormant Commerce Clause. See
id. at 545 (emphasis added) (“Commerce Neutrality puts the commerce back in the dormant 
[C]ommerce [C]lause.”).
257 See id. at 471 (emphasis added) (“[I]n most circumstances, Commerce Neutrality is identical 
to the Court’s oft-used internal consistency test.”).
258 Id. at 499.
259 Id. at 507.
260 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1310 (McKinney 2018) (listing permissible credits against income taxes 
imposed by New York cities, which does not include income taxes paid to other states).
261 Id. § 620.
262 See supra Section V.B (explaining that the New York City income tax is internally consistent).
263 Lirette & Viard, supra note 256.
264 Id.
265 New York State taxes nonresidents on their income sourced in the State, but nonresidents are 
not subject to the New York City income tax. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 631(a), 1302(a) (McKinney 2018).  
Using the same numbers as the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example, say Sam, an unmarried 
nonresident taxpayer, earns $1,000,000 in New York City. He would pay New York State income tax 
at an average rate of 6.8%, but would not pay any New York City income tax. See id. § 601(e)(2) 
(explaining that unmarried nonresidents are subject to the same personal income tax rates as unmarried 
residents); id. § 601(c)(1)(A) (detailing New York’s personal income tax rates on unmarried resident 
individuals); New York State Tax Rate Schedule, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN.,
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/it/it201i_tax_rate_schedule.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) 
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percent,266 and (3) intrastate transactions is 10.7 percent.267
Simple algebra demonstrates that the New York taxing scheme flunks 
the Competitive Neutrality equation in the Avril and Rob Discrimination 
Example. The sum of 6.8 percent (inbound tax rate) and 10.7 percent 
(outbound tax rate)268 minus the product of 6.8 percent (inbound tax rate) 
and 10.7 percent (outbound tax rate)269 results in competitive distortion, not 
neutrality.270 Thus, the economic analysis that the Wynne majority 
endorsed reveals that New York’s internally consistent taxing regime 
nonetheless discriminates against interstate commerce and therefore 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
3. Scholarly Theories on Discriminatory State Tax Provisions
There are three theories proposed by leading scholars to determine 
whether state business tax incentives that discriminate against interstate 
commerce violate the dormant Commerce Clause: (1) Professors Walter 
Hellerstein and Dan T. Coenen’s Coercive Powers Theory;271 (2) Professor 
Peter D. Enrich’s Economic Distortion Theory;272 and (3) Professor Philip 
M. Tatarowicz’s Permissible Burdens Theory.273 While these theories 
focus on business tax incentives, they can be similarly deployed to analyze 
the constitutionality of the New York City income tax, as both business tax 
incentives and the New York City income tax can be internally consistent.
                                                                                                                         
(requiring unmarried resident taxpayers with New York taxable income between $215,400 and 
$1,077,550 to pay “$13,825 plus 6.85% of excess over $215,400” in income taxes). Thus, New York’s 
tax rate on inbound transactions to New York City for purposes of the Competitive Neutrality equation 
would be 6.8%.
266 In the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example, Rob represents a taxpayer paying tax on 
outbound transactions. He is an unmarried New York City resident who earns $1,000,000 solely in 
another state. He pays combined New York State and City income tax at an average rate of 10.7 
percent. See supra Section V.C.1, note 251 and accompanying text (calculating Rob’s average 
combined New York State and City income tax rate). Thus, New York’s average tax rate on outbound 
transactions from New York City for purposes of the Competitive Neutrality equation would be 10.7 
percent.
267 In the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example, Avril represents a taxpayer paying tax on 
intrastate transactions. She is an unmarried New York City resident who earns $1,000,000 solely in 
New York City. She pays combined New York State and City income tax at an average rate of 10.7 
percent. See id. (calculating Avril’s average combined New York State and City income tax rate). Thus, 
New York’s average tax rate on intrastate transactions for purposes of the Competitive Neutrality 
equation would be 10.7 percent.
268 This equals 17.5 percent or 0.175.
269 This equals 0.7276 percent or 0.007276.
270 16.7724 percent is greater than, not less than or equal to, 10.7 percent. Therefore, under the 
economic analysis that the Court endorsed in Wynne, the internally consistent New York income tax 
regime is nonetheless discriminatory.
271 Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 247.
272 Enrich, supra note 243.
273 Philip M. Tatarowicz, Federalism, The Commerce Clause, and Discriminatory State Tax 
Incentives: A Defense of Unconditional Business Tax Incentives Limited to In-State Activities of the 
Taxpayer, 60 TAX. LAW. 835 (2007).
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For example, if every state offered an identical income tax credit to 
businesses that invest solely in-state, businesses engaged in interstate 
commerce would not bear a greater total income tax burden than 
businesses engaged in intrastate commerce. The tax incentive would satisfy 
the internal consistency test, but would nonetheless be discriminatory. A
discussion of the scholarly literature follows.
i. Professors Walter Hellerstein and Dan T. Coenen’s Coercive 
Powers Theory
In Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., the Sixth Circuit adopted a theory on
discriminatory state tax incentives proposed by Professors Hellerstein and
Coenen.274 This theory focuses on the “coercive power of the state.”275
Under this Coercive Powers Theory, states impermissibly coerce taxpayers 
via tax incentives that apply to existing tax liabilities, but not through the 
use of tax incentives that apply to additional, or new, tax liabilities.276 An 
example of a permissible non-coercive state tax incentive is a property tax 
exemption for the in-state construction of a new building.277 The state’s 
property tax would be an additional tax liability because the taxpayer 
would not be subject to the tax unless it engaged in in-state construction. 
The state is not offering to lower an already existing property tax liability 
in exchange for in-state development, but it is instead proposing a reprieve 
from “any additional property tax burdens.”278 Such a tax exemption would 
not implicate the coercive power of the state, and would not favor in-state 
over out-of-state investment in a “constitutionally []relevant” way.279
For current state residents, however, a personal income tax is an 
existing tax liability. Therefore, a state personal income tax provision that 
coerces taxpayers into earning income solely intrastate violates the 
Coercive Powers Theory, internal consistency notwithstanding. New York 
City residents are subject to the State and City income tax regardless of the 
source of their income, that is, the New York income tax is an existing tax 
obligation. 
                                                                                                                         
274 See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 743–46 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Professors 
Hellerstein and Coenen’s theory affirmatively).
275 Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 247, at 806.
276 See id. at 807 (emphasis added) (“At least one significant category of tax incentives, however, 
should escape invalidation: those tax incentives framed not as exemptions from or reductions of 
existing state tax liability but rather as exemptions from or reductions of additional state tax liability to 
which the taxpayer would be subjected only if the taxpayer were to engage in the targeted activity in 
the state.  In our judgment, such incentives neither favor in-state over out-of-state investment (except in 
a sense that should be constitutionally irrelevant) nor do they rely on the coercive power of the state to 
compel a choice favoring in-state investment.”).
277 See id. ([A] real property tax exemption for new construction in a state would pass muster . . 
.”)
278 Id. at 808.
279 Id. at 807.
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Returning to the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example above, New 
York’s defective partial credit results in a greater total income tax burden 
for Rob, a taxpayer engaged in interstate commerce, than for Avril, a
taxpayer earning income solely intrastate. As a result, New York’s refusal 
to grant a credit for income taxes paid to other states against the City
portion of its State income tax impermissibly coerces taxpayers into 
earning income solely in New York. Consequently, New York’s defective 
partial credit fails Professors Hellerstein and Coenen’s Coercive Powers 
Theory, and thus, consistent with their theory, would impermissibly 
discriminate against interstate commerce.
ii. Professor Peter D. Enrich’s Economic Distortion Theory
Professor Enrich’s Economic Distortion Theory is more skeptical of 
the constitutionality of state business tax incentives than the Coercive 
Powers Theory. The Economic Distortion Theory views “business location 
incentives [as] virtually per se unconstitutional.”280 Under this theory, tax
incentives that “distort[] economic decision[-]making in favor of in-state 
activity” would violate the dormant Commerce Clause.281
New York’s refusal to grant a credit for income taxes paid to other 
states against the City portion of its State income tax violates the Economic 
Distortion Theory. In the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example above, a
taxpayer engaged in interstate commerce (Rob) bears a greater total 
income tax burden than one earning income solely in New York (Avril),
which impermissibly distorts economic decision-making in favor of 
intrastate activity. New York’s defective partial credit encourages Rob to 
earn income in New York (as opposed to the Source State), as Avril, a 
taxpayer earning precisely the same amount of income, bears a lower total 
income tax burden merely because she earns that income in New York.
Therefore, consistent with Professor Enrich’s theory, New York’s income 
tax regime discriminates against interstate commerce, violating the 
dormant Commerce Clause.
iii. Professor Philip M. Tatarowicz’s Permissible Burdens Theory
Professor Tatarowicz’s Permissible Burdens Theory is more 
deferential to state business tax incentives than either the Coercive Powers 
Theory or the Economic Distortion Theory. The Permissible Burdens 
Theory creates a constitutional “safe harbor” for “unconditional . . . 
business tax incentives . . . limited to [the] in-state activities of the taxpayer 
. . . used by a state to . . . primarily compete for economic development.”282
This theory does not address the constitutionality of state tax provisions 
                                                                                                                         
280 Enrich, supra note 243, at 458.
281 Id. at 456.
282 Tatarowicz, supra note 275, at 882.
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that fall outside of the safe harbor.283
The relevant provision of the New York income tax scheme does not 
fall within Professor Tatarowicz’s safe harbor. The Permissible Burdens 
Theory therefore does not shield it from invalidation. Namely, New York’s 
defective partial credit is not limited to in-state activities. It both rewards 
in-state economic activity and penalizes taxpayers by imposing a greater 
total income tax burden for earning income in another state. As a result, 
New York’s defective partial credit does not receive per se protection from 
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny even under this exceptionally
deferential standard.
4. Why Should New York Provide the Credit Instead of the Source 
State?
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Wynne raised the question of whether the 
residence state or the source state must address the possible double taxation 
that results when two sovereigns exercise their legitimate taxing authority 
over the same interstate activity.284 One might ask why New York, and not 
the Source State, must address Rob’s greater total income tax burden in the 
Avril and Rob Discrimination Example. The scholarly literature on 
international tax discrimination, general principles of international 
taxation, and the Court’s teaching in the sales and use tax context provide
support for the conclusion that a state taxing income based on residence 
must grant a credit for income taxes paid to a source state to alleviate any
resulting double taxation.
i. Professors Ruth Mason and Michael S. Knoll’s Competitive 
Neutrality Principle
Professors Ruth Mason and Michael S. Knoll’s theory of tax 
discrimination is consistent with this Note’s argument that New York, and 
not the source state, must address the double taxation that results from the 
imposition of an income tax by both the residence state and the source 
state. According to Professors Mason and Knoll, non-discrimination in 
both international and multistate taxation285 requires “[C]ompetitive 
                                                                                                                         
283 Id. at 839. Presumably, Professor Tatarowicz would prefer the courts to analyze taxes falling 
outside the safe harbor under Pike’s balancing test or Complete Auto. See id. (“[T]ax incentives falling 
outside the safe harbor . . . . are best left to the judicial process and its balancing of federalist interests 
in light of each controversy’s unique facts and circumstances.”).
284 See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1813 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“As I see it, nothing in the Constitution or in prior decisions of this Court dictates that one 
of two States, the domiciliary State or the source State, must recede simply because both have lawful 
tax regimes reaching the same income.”).
285 See Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What is Tax Discrimination?, 121 YALE L.J. 1014, 1108 
(2012) (“A second preliminary question is whether there is any reason to think that the 
nondiscrimination principle in [the dormant Commerce Clause] would have the same meaning as the 
EU nondiscrimination principle. We suggest that there is.”); Knoll & Mason, The Economic 
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[N]eutrality,”286 which prevents states and foreign countries from adopting 
“tax systems [that] distort which people occupy particular jobs.”287
States and foreign countries are competitively neutral if they “adopt 
worldwide [income] taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes.”288
Under such an income tax scheme, “source taxes become irrelevant to 
competition because they are effectively refunded by the residence state 
through the unlimited credit.”289 This is precisely why New York, as 
opposed to the Source State, must alleviate Rob’s greater total income tax 
burden in the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example. New York taxes 
residents on their worldwide income, but only grants a partial, as opposed 
to an unlimited, credit for source taxes. As a result, it violates Professors
Mason and Knoll’s Competitive Neutrality principle—a concept they view 
as the “benchmark” of non-discriminatory taxation.290
ii. General Principles of International Taxation
Additionally, general principles of international taxation (and the 
Court’s reference in Wynne to those same principles in the context of 
multistate taxation)291 support the conclusion that states taxing income 
based on residence must defer to states taxing income based on source 
when both states have valid claims to taxing the same interstate activity.292
In the international context, countries taxing income based on residence 
must “alleviate [the inevitable] double taxation” that arises when another 
country taxes income based on source.293 For foreign sourced income, the 
“source country’s economic environment is likely to have played a larger 
role in the production of [that] income than the economic environment of 
the residence [country].”294 Therefore, as countries consider source 
                                                                                                                         
Foundation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, supra note 256, at 318–23 (applying the Competitive 
Neutrality principle in the context of state and local taxation).
286 Mason & Knoll, What is Tax Discrimination?, supra note 287, at 1014.
287 Id. at 1053.
288 Id. at 1060.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 1022.
291 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1801 (2015); see Hellerstein,
Deciphering the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 149, at 9 (explaining that the Court
“recogni[zed] [in Wynne] that the source-trumps-residence principle reflect[s] ‘the near-universal state 
practice,’ at least in the context of state personal income taxation.”).
292 Brief of The Maryland Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
8–9, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015); see also Hellerstein, 
Deciphering the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 149 (referring to the principle that “a 
residence-based tax must yield to a source-based tax to avoid the multiple taxation that would result 
from honoring both taxing claims in full” as a “generally accepted proposition, which appear[s] to be 
solidly grounded in the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause precedents . . .”).
293 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF 
UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 6 (1987).
294 RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUTSHELL 204 (8th ed. 2009).
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jurisdiction to be “primary,”295 the residence country will almost always
grant a credit for income taxes paid to the source country, which solves the 
double taxation quandary.296 A credit against the residence country’s 
income tax for income taxes paid to the source country both: (1) “improves 
the fairness of the income tax by equalizing the tax burdens imposed on 
U.S. persons engaged in [foreign commerce] with the tax burdens imposed 
on otherwise similarly situated U.S. persons engaged only in domestic 
[commerce],”297 and (2) “promote[s] the efficient use of capital by U.S. 
persons by removing a tax penalty on income-producing activities 
otherwise subject to a double tax.”298 By providing a credit, the residence 
country remains neutral with respect to domestic and foreign commerce. It
does not encourage domestic commerce at the expense of foreign 
commerce, and therefore does not impermissibly burden, or discriminate 
against, international commerce. This position is consistent with that of 
Professors Mason and Knoll.
The multi-jurisdictional issues that exist in international taxation are 
similarly present in multistate taxation. As a result, the international 
solution to the issue of double taxation—a credit against the residence 
country’s income tax for income taxes paid to the source country—is 
equally applicable in the context of multistate taxation, a proposition the 
Court acknowledged in Wynne.299 Importantly, New York recognizes this 
requirement and does provide a credit against its income tax for income 
taxes paid to other states. What New York fails to do, however, is provide 
a full credit for income taxes paid to other states, and, therefore, like 
Maryland in Wynne, New York offers taxpayers a defective partial credit. 
The Court implied in Wynne that the failure of a state to grant a full credit 
against its income tax for income taxes paid to other states discriminates 
against interstate commerce.300 That principle compels the conclusion that 
                                                                                                                         
295 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 295, at 7; see also DOERNBERG, supra note 296
(explaining that, for foreign sourced income, the source country has the “first crack at taxation, and if 
any adjustment is to be made, the [residence country] must make it.”).
296 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 295, at 6.
297 MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, THE INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX RULES OF THE UNITED STATES 4-
101 (2d ed. 2000).
298 Id. at 4-101–4-102.
299 See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1801 (2015) (emphasis 
added) (“[A]s our Commerce Clause jurisprudence [has] developed, the States have almost entirely 
abandoned [protectionist regimes that favor intrastate over interstate commerce], perhaps in recognition 
of their doubtful constitutionality. Today, the near-universal state practice is to provide credits against 
personal income taxes for such taxes paid to other States.”) (citing 2 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN &
WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 20-163–20-164 (3d ed. 2003)).
300 Id.; see also HELLERSTEIN, HELLERSTEIN & SWAINE, supra note 213, at § 8.02(1)(a)(i) (“[W]e 
believe the Commerce Clause does not deprive the state of all power to tax value to which another state 
may lay a competing and stronger claim. Rather, the state retains the authority to exercise its well-
established residence-based taxing rights, except to the extent that the exercise of such power in fact 
creates a risk of multiple taxation. A properly designed credit fully satisfies that obligation, and the 
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New York’s defective partial credit fails dormant Commerce Clause 
scrutiny.
iii. The Court’s Teaching in the Sales and Use Tax Context
Finally, in the context of state sales and use taxes, the Court has 
recognized that residence states, not source states, are tasked with 
alleviating the inevitable double taxation that arises when two states can 
tax the same underlying activity.301 The state of purchase in the sales and 
use tax context is equivalent to the source state in the income tax context—
taxpayers in both situations are only subject to taxation because of, and 
stemming from, the economic activities they conduct in a particular state.
Likewise, the state of use for purposes of sales and use taxes is equivalent 
to the residence state for purposes of an income tax—taxpayers in both 
contexts are subject to taxation merely because of where they happen to 
maintain a residence.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., the Court 
explained that when a consumer purchases goods in one state and 
transports those goods for use in another state, “that use of goods is taxed 
[by the state of use] only to the extent that their prior sale has escaped 
taxation.”302 While both states have a legitimate claim to tax the 
consumer’s purchase of goods (either through a sales tax or use tax), due to 
“the primacy of taxes on sales,” the state of use provides “a credit for [sales 
taxes] paid [to the state of sale]” to “free [the purchaser] from multiple 
taxation.”303
Furthermore, as the Court proclaimed in Henneford v. Silas Mason
Co., an earlier case upholding the constitutionality of Washington’s use 
tax:
Equality is a theme that runs through all sections of the [sales 
and use tax] statute. There shall be a tax upon the use, but 
                                                                                                                         
Commerce Clause demands no more. Whatever doubts there may have been prior to Wynne about this 
proposition, Wynne has clearly removed them, at least in the context of personal income taxation by 
observing that ‘Maryland could remedy the infirmity in its tax scheme by offering, as most States do, a 
credit against income taxes paid to other States.’”). A “properly designed credit” is one that “in fact 
eliminates the residence-based tax on the same value that is subject to tax in a jurisdiction with the 
source-based or situs-based claim, up to the amount of the source-based or situs-based tax.” Id. §
8.02(1)(a)(i) n.39.1. New York’s credit is not “properly designed” because, in certain circumstances
(like the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example), it fails to fully “eliminate[] the residence-based tax 
on the same value . . . subject to tax [by a source state].” Id.
301 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 194 (1995) (emphasis added) 
(“Since any use tax would have to comply with [the dormant Commerce Clause], the tax scheme could 
not apply differently to goods and services purchased out of state from those purchased domestically. 
Presumably, then, it would not apply when another State’s sales tax had previously been paid, or would 
apply subject to credit for such payment.”).
302 Id.
303 Id.
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subject to an offset if another use or sales tax has been paid 
for the same thing. This is true where the offsetting tax 
became payable to Washington by reason of purchase or use 
within the state. It is true in exactly the same measure where 
the offsetting tax has been paid to another state by reason of
use or purchase there. No one who uses the property in 
Washington after buying it at retail is to be exempt from a tax 
upon the privilege of enjoyment except to the extent that he 
has paid a use or sales tax somewhere. Every one who has 
paid a use or sales tax anywhere, or, more accurately, in any 
state, is to that extent to be exempt from the payment of 
another tax in Washington.304
This concept ensures that “the stranger from afar is subject to no 
greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the 
gates.”305 The logical extension of this principle to income taxation would 
mandate that the residence state provide a credit for income taxes paid to 
the source state to alleviate multiple taxation—something New York fails 
to do in full, as it only provides a credit for income taxes paid to other 
states against a portion of its income tax.
D. New York State Should Not Fear a Significant Revenue Loss From 
Granting a Full Rather than a Partial Credit
A constitutional challenge to the New York City income tax could only 
arise in a narrow scenario. A taxpayer challenging the New York City 
income tax would need an excess credit after crediting income taxes paid 
to other states against the State portion of the New York income tax. That 
is, the taxpayer must earn income sourced in a state with higher effective 
income tax rates than New York. Otherwise, the taxpayer would simply 
exhaust the credit by using it to reduce the State portion of his or her New 
York income tax burden.
For example, if Rob, an unmarried New York City resident, earned 
$1,000,000 of income sourced in a state where he paid income tax at an 
average rate of 6 percent, he would owe $60,000 in income taxes to the 
source state and $107,000 in income taxes to New York pre-credit—
$68,000 on the State portion and $39,000 on the City portion. Rob would 
then exhaust his $60,000 credit for income taxes paid to the source state 
against the State portion of the New York income tax. New York City’s 
refusal to grant a credit for income taxes paid to other states would be 
irrelevant because Rob would not have an excess credit to apply against his 
New York City income tax liability.
                                                                                                                         
304 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583–84 (1937) (emphasis added).
305 Id. at 584.
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In narrow circumstances, California, one of the very few states having 
higher income tax rates than New York,306 could be the source state 
generating a constitutional challenge to the New York income tax scheme
brought by a New York City resident. Certainly, some wealthy tech 
executives and entertainment figures are New York City residents (and 
nonresidents of California).
A challenge to the law would be factually straightforward. For 
example, assume Alex (an unmarried New York City resident) earns 
$1,000,000 of California sourced income.307 Further, assume Alex would 
pay California income tax at an average rate of 10.9 percent308 and New 
York State and City income tax at an average combined rate of 10.7 
percent.309 He would owe $109,000 in income taxes to California and
$107,000 in income taxes to New York pre-credit—$68,000 on the State 
portion and $39,000 on the City portion. He could use $68,000 of the 
$109,000 credit for income taxes paid to California to wholly eliminate the 
State portion of the New York income tax. Under New York law, however, 
Alex could not use his excess credit of $41,000 to eliminate the City 
                                                                                                                         
306 Avril and Rob (individuals with $1,000,000 of taxable income) would each pay California 
income tax at an average rate of approximately 10.9 percent. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041(a)(1) 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); see 2017 California Tax Rates and Exemptions,
STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, https://perma.cc/NS83-34DA (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) 
(requiring unmarried taxpayers with income over $551,473 to pay $53,606.76 plus 12.3 percent of the 
excess over $551,473 in income tax to California). For high earners, New Jersey’s income tax rates are 
also higher than New York’s. For example, Avril and Rob would each pay New Jersey income tax at an 
average rate of approximately 7.5 percent. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:2–1 (West, Westlaw through 
L.2017, c. 293 and J.R. No. 19); New Jersey Tax Rate Schedules 2017, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, DIVISION OF TAX’N, https://perma.cc/BF98-KGAU (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) (requiring 
unmarried taxpayers with income over $500,000 to pay income tax on 8.97 percent of their income 
minus $15,126.25). Unlike California, however, New Jersey’s income tax rates are only slightly higher 
than New York’s for wealthy individuals. The potential spoils of victory are likely to be too trivial in 
most cases to justify litigation. Therefore, New Jersey is unlikely to be the source state in a 
constitutional challenge to the New York income tax scheme brought by a New York City resident.
307 The numbers used in this hypothetical are merely for simplicity purposes—a taxpayer 
challenging the law would likely have higher earnings. Otherwise, the costs of litigation might not be 
worth the potential reduction in income tax liability.
308 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); see
2017 California Tax Rates and Exemptions, STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD,
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2017-California-Tax-Rates-and-Exemptions.shtml (last visited Dec. 14,
2018) (requiring unmarried taxpayers with income over $551,473 to pay $53,606.76 plus 12.3 percent 
of the excess over $551,473 in income tax to California).
309 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1304(a)(3)(A) (McKinney 2018); New York City Tax Rate Schedule, N.Y.
STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN.,
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/it/nyc_tax_rate_schedule.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) 
(requiring unmarried resident taxpayers with New York taxable income over $50,000 to pay “$1,813 
plus 3.876% of excess over $50,000” to New York in New York City income taxes); N.Y. TAX LAW §
601(c)(1)(A) (McKinney 2018); New York State Tax Rate Schedule, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION 
& FIN., https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/it/it201i_tax_rate_schedule.pdf (last visited Dec. 14,
2018) (requiring unmarried resident taxpayers with New York taxable income between $215,400 and 
$1,077,550 to pay “$13,825 plus 6.85% of excess over $215,400” to New York in state income taxes).  
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portion of the State income tax.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Wynne relied on the internal consistency test developed 
under the fair apportionment prong of Complete Auto to strike down 
Maryland’s refusal to grant a credit for income taxes paid to other states 
against a purportedly local income tax. In so doing, the Court conflated the 
fair apportionment and non-discrimination prongs. Upon a finding of 
internal inconsistency, the Court deemed the Maryland income tax scheme 
discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional under the dormant 
Commerce Clause. The question of whether an internally consistent, and 
therefore fairly apportioned, tax may nonetheless discriminate against 
interstate commerce was not before the Court in Wynne.
The Court’s discrimination case law and the relevant scholarly 
literature demonstrate that an internally consistent tax may nonetheless be 
discriminatory. Additionally, the scholarly literature and the Court’s 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, combined with general 
principles of international taxation, establish that states taxing income 
based on residence must provide a credit for income taxes paid to a source 
state to offset the double taxation that may result when two sovereigns 
exercise their legitimate taxing authority over the same interstate activity.
Consequently, New York’s refusal to grant a credit for income taxes paid 
to other states against the New York City income tax violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause.
